Ex parte J.W.B. and J.J.B.

D.W. and J.B. were married on January 25, 2011, and divorced over a year and a half later (June 14, 2012). Testimony at trial indicated that a child was conceived in late September or early October 2012, and born on June 17, 2013. J.B. did not disclose the identity of the child's biological father at delivery. D.W. did not register his intent to claim paternity of the child, pursuant to the Alabama Putative Father Registry Act ("PFRA"). Immediately after the birth of the child, J.B. placed the child for adoption. On June 19, 2013, the adoptive parents filed a petition in the probate court seeking to adopt the child. Subsequent to the filing of the petition, the adoptive parents informed the probate court that J.B. and D.W. had applied for a marriage license a few months before the child's birth and that "[t]he natural mother's ex-husband [D.W.] will need to be served with a petitioner's notice of hearing because there is concern that [D.W. and J.B.] may have [been] married" when the child was born. D.W. received notice of the impending adoption, and intervened to stop it. The adoptive parents moved to dismiss D.W.'s adoption contest on the ground that he had failed to register pursuant to the PFRA before or within 30 days of the child's birth. Summary judgment was denied, and trial proceeded on whether D.W. and J.B. were common-law married in June 2013 when the child was born. The probate court ultimately found that D.W. and J.B. were not common-law married at the time the child was born. D.W. appealed the probate court's judgment to the Court of Civil Appeals. In a two-judge opinion, the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the probate court's judgment in part; reversed it in part; and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court determined that D.W. preserved for appellate review his contention that "he had demonstrated the requisite commitment to fatherhood before the birth of the child such that he retained a constitutional right to object to the adoption of the child by [the adoptive parents] regardless of the operation of the PFRA or the AAC [Alabama Adoption Code]," and that remand was required for the probate court to determine "whether [D.W.] had grasped his constitutionally protected 'opportunity interest' by his prebirth conduct toward [J.B.] and the child and his postbirth actions to protect his legal relationship with the child." The Supreme Court rejected that D.W. preserved his constitutional argument, and reversed the Court of Civil Appeals' decision. View "Ex parte J.W.B. and J.J.B." on Justia Law