Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

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A married couple with two minor children experienced significant changes in their financial and professional circumstances during their marriage. The husband started several businesses, including an insurance agency and other ventures with local investors. In early 2023, he faced serious legal and regulatory issues, including a large default judgment and revocation of his insurance and gaming licenses, followed by criminal indictments. Amid these developments, the wife discovered evidence of his extramarital affair and initiated divorce proceedings, seeking an equitable division of marital property and debts. During the divorce, the husband retained counsel and used marital funds to commence a lawsuit against his former business partners to recover money he had invested in their shared businesses.The divorce case was tried in the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Lincoln County, South Dakota. Both parties disputed the classification and valuation of assets, notably the pending lawsuit. The husband argued that the lawsuit should be treated as his separate property due to an alleged pretrial agreement. The wife disputed the existence of such an agreement and asserted that the lawsuit was a marital asset. The circuit court found no binding agreement on the lawsuit’s classification, treated the pending lawsuit as marital property, valued it at $350,000 based on the invested retainer and a percentage of the claimed amount, and assigned it to the husband.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. It held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in classifying the pending lawsuit as marital property subject to equitable division. The Supreme Court found that the valuation of the lawsuit was not clearly erroneous, as it reasonably reflected the evidence presented at trial. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s decisions regarding classification and valuation, and granted the wife’s request for appellate attorney fees. View "King v. King" on Justia Law

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The case involves two parents, Staiger and Johnson, who were never married but share one minor child. The original judgment awarded primary residential responsibility to Johnson, with Staiger receiving scheduled parenting time. Following Johnson’s DUI arrest—during which the child was present—Staiger sought to obtain primary residential responsibility, or alternatively, equal parenting time and joint decision-making. Staiger also requested modifications to safety measures in the parenting plan and the removal of certain alcohol testing requirements for himself. Johnson, as a result of her DUI, was required to participate in a sobriety program and begin mental health services.Previously, the District Court of Morton County, South Central Judicial District, modified the parenting plan to include a graduated visitation schedule for Staiger, alcohol testing requirements, and behavioral conditions. Upon Johnson’s DUI conviction, Staiger moved for further modification. The district court found that Johnson’s DUI incident did not constitute a material change in circumstances warranting a change in primary residential responsibility, noting there was no evidence the child was harmed or suffered a decline in welfare. The court did, however, modify the parenting plan to add alcohol and mental health restrictions for Johnson and removed one of Staiger’s alcohol testing requirements. Staiger’s subsequent motions for reconsideration and clarification were denied.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the district court’s findings under the clearly erroneous standard. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s determination that Johnson’s DUI did not rise to the level of a material change in circumstances affecting the child’s welfare, and that the modifications to the parenting plan were supported by the record. The Supreme Court also upheld the denial of Staiger’s motions for reconsideration and clarification, finding no abuse of discretion. Johnson’s request for attorney’s fees was denied. The district court’s second amended judgment and related orders were affirmed. View "Johnson v. Staiger" on Justia Law

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The parties, who share two children, divorced in 2022 and initially agreed to share residential responsibility on a week-on, week-off basis. After their divorce, Ashlyn Clemenson moved to Bottineau and began living with her boyfriend and the children’s half-sibling. The parties later stipulated to an amended judgment to reflect changes in income and child support, maintaining equal residential responsibility. In July 2024, Cole Clemenson moved to modify residential responsibility, seeking primary custody of the children, while Ashlyn Clemenson filed a cross-motion for primary residential responsibility. Both parties agreed that Ashlyn’s relocation constituted a material change in circumstances, and a two-day trial was held in January 2025.The District Court of McHenry County, Northeast Judicial District, found that Cole Clemenson had a history of domestic violence, including incidents in 2013 and 2021, and concluded that the presumption against awarding residential responsibility to a parent who has perpetrated domestic violence under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1)(j) applied. The district court designated Ashlyn Clemenson as the primary residential parent, granting Cole Clemenson parenting time on alternating weekends and weekly during the summer. Cole Clemenson appealed, challenging the application of the domestic violence presumption, the findings regarding serious bodily injury, the court’s weighing of best interest factors, and the sufficiency of the district court’s findings.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the district court’s findings for clear error. It held that the domestic violence presumption in N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1)(j) applies even when the parent previously shared equal residential responsibility and does not require serious bodily injury to be proximate to the proceeding. The Supreme Court determined that the district court did not clearly err in its findings or in weighing the best interest factors, and affirmed the amended judgment designating Ashlyn Clemenson as the primary residential parent. The request for attorney’s fees was denied. View "Clemenson v. Clemenson" on Justia Law

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After the divorce of a couple who had three children—two minors and one adult—a parenting plan was established. Several years later, the father moved for contempt, alleging that the mother prevented his relationship and communication with the children, in violation of the parenting plan. The mother responded by seeking a modification of parenting time and requested a mental examination of the father, citing concerns about his behavior toward the children. She submitted affidavits from herself and their children, which described the father's angry outbursts and alleged emotional mistreatment.The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, denied the father’s motion for contempt, reduced his parenting time, and ordered a mental examination under N.D.R.Civ.P. 35, with the father responsible for the costs of both the examination and supervised parenting sessions. The court also admitted the children’s affidavits into evidence over the father's hearsay objection. The court’s order delegated authority to a therapist to determine the progression of the father’s “stepped” parenting plan, allowing the therapist to control when and how parenting time would increase.On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court found that while the admission of the children’s affidavits was an abuse of discretion, it was harmless error because their live testimony provided similar evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed the findings that a material change of circumstances justified modifying parenting time, upheld the requirement for a mental examination at the father's expense, and found no abuse of discretion in denying contempt against the mother. However, it reversed the delegation of decision-making authority to the therapist regarding progression in the parenting plan, holding that such delegation was improper, and remanded for a court-supervised plan. The court also partially granted the mother’s motion to strike portions of the father’s appellate brief and imposed double costs against him. View "Boyda v. Boyda" on Justia Law

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A minor child, J.B., was placed in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Child Protection Services (CPS) in May 2021 and subsequently placed with foster parents, John and Amy Caldwell, in June 2021. The initial permanency plan was reunification with a parent or placement with a relative. In October 2022, J.B.’s maternal great aunt, Wanda Hines, learned of the proceedings and sought placement of J.B. with her and her husband, James Hines, in Georgia. After the youth court terminated the parental rights of J.B.’s biological parents in December 2022, both the foster parents and the relatives sought to adopt J.B.The DeSoto County Chancery Court first granted the foster parents’ petition for adoption, but the relatives intervened and challenged the adoption, arguing that CPS policy and the foster contract required exhaustion of family placement options before adoption by non-relatives. CPS also sought dismissal or a stay, asserting ongoing efforts for relative placement. The chancellor initially issued a temporary order granting the foster parents custody and the relatives visitation, but the Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed this order on interlocutory appeal for lack of a hearing and remanded for a full hearing.On remand, the chancery court held a hearing and found that the best interest of the child was the controlling factor, not a preference for relatives. The court determined that J.B. had lived with the Caldwells for most of her life, was thriving in their care, and that placement with them would avoid unnecessary trauma. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the chancery court’s decision, holding that the best interest of the child prevails over CPS policy or contractual arguments, and that substantial credible evidence supported the adoption by the foster parents. The court also rejected the relatives’ judicial estoppel argument. View "In the Matter of the Petition for the Adoption of the Minor Child v. Caldwell" on Justia Law

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A married couple with two young children experienced a breakdown in their relationship, leading to separation in 2020. The husband, who lived near his supportive family, filed for divorce and sought primary custody of the children, citing concerns about the wife’s mental health, including her history of depression and suicide attempts. The wife, who lacked a family support network but maintained employment and support from friends, counterclaimed for divorce and also sought custody, alleging the husband’s controlling behavior and alcohol use. Both parties presented conflicting testimony regarding their roles as caregivers and the circumstances leading to their separation.The Choctaw County Chancery Court initially entered a temporary custody order, alternating physical custody every fifteen days. The parties later agreed to divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences, leaving custody and support to the chancellor. After a trial, the chancellor applied the Albright factors and found that the mental health and moral fitness factors slightly favored the husband, awarding him primary physical custody while granting joint legal custody. The wife moved for a new trial and for the chancellor’s recusal, arguing errors in the Albright analysis and alleging judicial bias, but both motions were denied.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the chancellor’s findings under a deferential standard, asking whether they were supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct legal standards were applied. The court held that the chancellor did not abuse his discretion in weighing the mental health and moral fitness factors, nor was there reversible error in the lack of specific findings regarding detrimental impact. The court also found no merit in the claims of judicial bias or error in denying a new trial. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the judgment of the Chancery Court. View "Edwards v. Edwards" on Justia Law

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A couple who had lived together in Montana since the mid-1990s had their relationship recognized as a common law marriage. After separating in 2013, the wife petitioned for divorce in 2014. During the dissolution proceedings, both parties exchanged financial information but did not submit final declarations of disclosure as required by Montana law. Following a bench trial, the District Court issued a Final Decree in December 2018, dissolving the marriage, distributing the marital estate, and ordering the husband to pay spousal and child support, as well as the mortgage on the marital home awarded to the wife. Neither party objected at the time to the lack of final disclosure statements.Subsequent litigation focused on the husband’s financial obligations under the Final Decree. The husband sought to modify or suspend his support obligations, leading to further discovery disputes and contempt proceedings when he failed to make required payments. The District Court repeatedly enforced the Final Decree, denied the husband’s motions to modify, and awarded attorney fees to the wife. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed these orders in a prior appeal. In December 2023, the husband, for the first time, moved to set aside the Final Decree on the basis that final disclosure statements had not been exchanged. The District Court denied this motion as untimely and because the statutory basis for relief did not apply.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s denial of the husband’s motion to set aside the Final Decree and his request for a new trial. The Court held that Montana law only authorizes setting aside a judgment if a party committed perjury in a final disclosure statement, which was not possible here since no such statements were exchanged. The Court also awarded the wife her attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal, remanding to the District Court to determine the reasonable amount. View "Marriage of: Kelly and Camp" on Justia Law

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A mother was the subject of an abuse and neglect petition filed by the Department of Human Services in February 2020, alleging that her long-standing substance abuse and incidents of domestic violence prevented her from properly parenting her child, R.B. At adjudication, she stipulated to her substance abuse issues, and the Circuit Court of Kanawha County found her to be an abusing and neglecting parent. After multiple unsuccessful improvement periods, the court terminated her custodial rights in April 2021, placing R.B. in a legal guardianship. The mother did not appeal this order.In early 2023, R.B.’s legal guardian became gravely ill and died. The mother moved to modify the dispositional order, seeking reinstatement of her rights, claiming she had completed rehabilitation and maintained sobriety. The Department also moved for modification, seeking custody of R.B. After investigation, the court found the mother had relapsed and failed to comply with drug testing and other requirements. R.B. was placed with relatives, and the mother continued to struggle with substance abuse, testing positive for methamphetamine in February 2024. The Department then moved to terminate her parental rights.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case, applying an abuse of discretion standard to the circuit court’s order and a clearly erroneous standard to its factual findings. The court held that the death of the guardian constituted a material change in circumstances and that termination of parental rights was in R.B.’s best interests, given the mother’s ongoing substance abuse and inability to provide a stable environment. The court affirmed the circuit court’s order modifying disposition and terminating the mother’s parental rights. View "In re R.B." on Justia Law

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Two children, R.D. and S.D., were the subject of a dependency and neglect case initiated in Tennessee in 2019 due to their mother’s substance abuse and their father’s incarceration for assaulting the mother. The Tennessee court placed the children with their maternal grandmother, then later with their aunt and uncle, T.V. and R.V., in West Virginia after the grandmother’s death. In February 2022, the Tennessee court granted T.V. and R.V. full legal and physical custody but did not terminate the parents’ rights. T.V. and R.V. subsequently petitioned for adoption in West Virginia, mistakenly asserting that parental rights had been terminated.The Circuit Court of McDowell County, West Virginia, granted the adoption petitions in June 2022, believing the Tennessee court had terminated parental rights. The Tennessee court later clarified that it had not done so and transferred jurisdiction to the West Virginia court in April 2023. The circuit court consolidated all related proceedings, and various motions followed, including amended adoption petitions and requests to terminate parental rights. In June 2024, the circuit court upheld the prior adoption orders and, alternatively, modified the Tennessee disposition to terminate the father’s parental rights.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case. It held that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) to make custody determinations or terminate parental rights in June 2022, rendering those adoption orders void. However, the court affirmed the circuit court’s later modification of disposition and termination of parental rights after jurisdiction was properly transferred from Tennessee. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "In re R.D. and S.D." on Justia Law

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A two-year-old child, M.B., was placed with foster parents who are members of an Old Order Amish community shortly after his birth. The foster parents had previously adopted M.B.’s three biological sisters, who also reside in their home. Concerns were raised by M.B.’s guardian ad litem regarding the suitability of this placement, primarily because the Amish foster parents would limit M.B.’s formal education to eighth grade, consistent with their religious beliefs. Additional concerns included the lack of regular pediatric care, limited vaccination, restricted exposure to technology, and the potential for racial non-acceptance within the Amish community, as M.B. is biracial.The Circuit Court of Kanawha County reviewed a motion by the guardian ad litem to remove M.B. from the foster home. The court considered evidence and testimony, including the foster father’s statements about education, medical care, and community acceptance. The court also reviewed a special commissioner’s report, which acknowledged the loving and stable environment provided by the foster parents but noted potential limitations related to education, healthcare, and cultural exposure. Ultimately, the circuit court denied the motion to remove M.B., finding that the foster home was stable, loving, and in the child’s best interests, and that the court could not discriminate against the family based on religion or lifestyle.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The court held that the Foster Child Bill of Rights does not mandate removal from a placement solely because one or more statutory rights may be limited, but instead requires a best-interest-of-the-child analysis considering all relevant factors. The court found that the circuit court’s findings were supported by the record and that M.B.’s placement with the Amish foster parents did not violate his statutory or constitutional rights. View "In re M.B." on Justia Law