Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Dennis Schaub and Louise Schaub were married in 1980, divorced in 2010, and reunited in 2014, establishing a common law marriage. They separated again in 2017, and Louise filed for dissolution in 2018. During their first divorce, they had a property settlement agreement that heavily favored Dennis. After their second separation, the District Court awarded Dennis most of the marital assets, citing the short reconciliation period and Louise's lack of contribution to the marital estate.The Twelfth Judicial District Court initially awarded Dennis his bank accounts, real property, vehicles, and other personal property, while Louise received only her personal items. Louise appealed, and the Montana Supreme Court remanded the case, instructing the District Court to reconsider the equitable distribution of the marital estate, taking into account the factors in § 40-4-202, MCA, and the couple's long marital history.On remand, the District Court held a hearing and found that Dennis's estate was valued at $569,341.08, while Louise's was valued at $0. The court ordered Dennis to make equalization payments to Louise totaling $242,400 over fifteen years to achieve a more equitable distribution of the marital estate, with Dennis receiving 58% and Louise 42%. The court did not require Dennis to pay interest on these payments.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision to award equalization payments, finding it supported by substantial evidence. However, the Supreme Court reversed the decision not to include interest on the payments, citing § 25-9-205, MCA, which mandates interest on judgments. The case was remanded to the District Court to amend the decree to include interest and correct a scrivener's error in the payment schedule. View "In re Marriage of Schaub" on Justia Law

Angelica Joy Daoang lived in a house co-owned by her aunt, Carolina Balanza, and Balanza’s ex-boyfriend, Nicholas Perry. In September 2022, Perry and Balanza obtained restraining orders against each other due to domestic violence, and Perry did not return to the house. On February 16, 2024, Daoang obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) against Perry following an incident on February 14, 2024, where Perry entered the house through a window, leading to a confrontation with Daoang.The District Court of the Second Circuit dissolved the TRO after a hearing on February 26, 2024. The court found a lack of clear and convincing evidence of harassment as defined by Hawai'i Revised Statutes § 604-10.5. The court determined that there was no evidence of physical harm or threats thereof, and no "course of conduct" that would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress. The court also questioned Daoang’s legal right to prevent Perry, a co-owner, from entering the house, ultimately concluding that Daoang was a guest rather than a tenant.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the district court did not err in dissolving the TRO, as there was no clear and convincing evidence of harassment under either definition provided by HRS § 604-10.5. The court noted that a single incident does not constitute a "course of conduct" required for harassment. The Supreme Court also provided guidance for handling cases related to domestic violence, emphasizing the importance of considering safety and suggesting alternative legal avenues for resolving conflicts. View "Daoang v. Perry" on Justia Law

R.W. and J.R. are the biological parents of twins Rachel and Joshua, born prematurely on May 9, 2022. Both R.W. and the twins tested positive for amphetamines at birth. The Jackson County Youth Court placed the children in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Child Protection Services (CPS) and later adjudicated them as neglected children. The court also ruled that CPS could bypass reasonable efforts to reunify the twins with their parents. R.W. and J.R. appealed this decision.The Jackson County Youth Court initially held an emergency custody hearing, followed by an adjudication hearing where the twins were declared neglected. The court found that R.W. had a history of substance abuse and had previously lost custody of her other children. J.R. was incarcerated for failing to register as a sex offender. The court ruled that CPS could bypass efforts to reunify the children with their parents due to the parents' history and current circumstances. R.W. and J.R. raised issues on appeal regarding jurisdiction, venue, and the sufficiency of evidence supporting the neglect adjudication and the bypass of reunification efforts.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and affirmed the youth court's judgment. The court held that the youth court had both subject-matter and personal jurisdiction, and that Jackson County was the proper venue. The evidence presented, including the positive drug tests and the parents' histories, was sufficient to support the adjudication of neglect. The court also found that bypassing reasonable efforts to reunify the children with their parents was justified based on the parents' past terminations of parental rights and J.R.'s criminal history. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the youth court's decision. View "R.W. v. Mississippi Department of Child Protection Services" on Justia Law

J.F.R., an 80-year-old individual diagnosed with cognitive impairments and dementia, lives with her daughter Stephanie in Montana. A dispute arose between Stephanie and J.F.R.'s other daughter, Jana, regarding J.F.R.'s care and financial management. Jana filed a petition for the appointment of both daughters as co-guardians and co-conservators, while J.F.R. supported Stephanie's appointment as sole guardian and conservator. The District Court initially appointed both daughters as temporary co-guardians and co-conservators but later vacated this order, directing the parties to proceed with discovery.The District Court of the Third Judicial District, Granite County, held a hearing and found substantial evidence of financial mismanagement and communication issues between the daughters. The court noted that J.F.R.'s assets were being depleted rapidly and that her current advisors were insufficient to protect her financial interests. Consequently, the court appointed the Western Montana Chapter for Prevention of Elder Abuse (Western) as J.F.R.'s temporary conservator and Western, Stephanie, and Jana as temporary co-guardians.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The court held that the District Court did not err in determining that J.F.R.'s welfare required immediate action, justifying the appointment of a temporary guardian and conservator. The court also found no abuse of discretion in appointing Western, despite the statutory order of priority, as the circumstances warranted a neutral third party. Additionally, the court ruled that Western's dual role as co-guardian and conservator did not violate statutory provisions, and the appointment of a neuropsychologist for evaluation was appropriate under the circumstances. View "In re J.F.R." on Justia Law

A police officer responded to a hotel where a mother, RN, was intoxicated and with her six-year-old son, JN. Due to her intoxication and the presence of a violent boyfriend at home, JN was taken into protective custody. RN tested positive for amphetamines and had a high blood alcohol content. The State filed a neglect petition, and JN was placed in foster care. The initial permanency plan was family reunification, and RN was required to follow a case plan that included maintaining sobriety and addressing her relationship with her boyfriend.The juvenile court held a shelter care hearing and placed JN in the State's temporary custody. RN made some progress but failed to maintain sobriety and continued her relationship with her boyfriend. The court extended the consent decree to allow more time for RN to comply with the case plan. However, RN missed drug tests, tested positive for methamphetamine, and failed to appear at a hearing, leading to the revocation of the consent decree and the adjudication of neglect. The permanency plan was updated to require inpatient drug treatment, but RN did not check into treatment until the day before the permanency hearing.The Wyoming Supreme Court previously reversed the juvenile court's order changing the permanency plan to adoption due to the lack of a reasonable efforts determination by the Department of Family Services (DFS). On remand, the juvenile court determined that DFS had made reasonable efforts based on the evidence from the original hearing and reaffirmed the change in the permanency plan. The court found that despite RN's bond with JN, her inability to maintain sobriety and provide a stable environment justified the change to adoption. The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the juvenile court's decision, finding sufficient evidence that the change was in JN's best interests. View "RN v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

A couple, who share one child, E.A., sought to modify their child support and custody arrangements following their divorce. The father, Mr. Builta, requested a reduction in his child support payments due to an increase in the mother, Ms. Guzmán’s, income and his own additional dependents. He also sought changes to the custody schedule and restrictions on Ms. Guzmán’s school visits during his custodial time. Ms. Guzmán sought sole legal and physical custody, citing Mr. Builta’s planned move to Maryland and his alleged misuse of tie-breaking authority in decision-making for E.A.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia initially ordered Mr. Builta to pay $1,736 per month in child support and granted joint legal custody with tie-breaking authority to Mr. Builta. The court later modified the child support to $1,644 per month, using the Holland method to account for the parents' increased combined income. The court found no substantial and material change in circumstances to justify altering the custody arrangement but made minor adjustments to the custody schedule and communication requirements.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It affirmed the use of the Holland method for calculating child support but found errors in the trial court’s income calculations and procedural steps. The appellate court remanded the case for recalculating child support with correct income data. It also reversed the trial court’s changes to the custody exchange day and the restriction on Ms. Guzmán’s school visits, finding no substantial and material change in circumstances to justify these modifications. The court upheld the trial court’s decision not to alter the joint custody arrangement, emphasizing the child’s best interests and the parents' ability to cooperate despite their conflicts. View "Builta v. Guzman" on Justia Law

A mother sought to regain custody of her children, who had been living with their uncle and aunt in Canada for two years. The uncle and aunt opposed the return, arguing it was in the children's best interests to stay with them. Concurrent custody proceedings took place in Alaska and Canada, with Alaska ultimately asserting jurisdiction. After a custody trial, the uncle and aunt were awarded physical and legal custody of the children. The mother appealed, claiming the court made several legal and factual errors.The Alaska Superior Court found that it had jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) and consolidated the cases. During the trial, the court heard testimony from multiple witnesses, including the mother, the uncle, the aunt, and experts. The court found that the children were thriving in Canada and that returning them to their mother would be detrimental due to her erratic behavior and substance use. The court also conducted in camera interviews with the children, who expressed a preference to stay with their uncle and aunt.The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's decision. The court held that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding custody to the uncle and aunt, finding that the children's welfare required it. The court also found that the Superior Court correctly applied the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) requirements, determining that the placement constituted a "foster care placement" and that active efforts had been made to prevent the breakup of the Indian family. The court concluded that the expert witnesses were properly qualified and that the evidence supported the finding that returning the children to their mother would likely cause serious emotional damage. The custody and visitation orders were upheld as not being an abuse of discretion. View "O'Brien v. Delaplain" on Justia Law

A mother sought child support from the father for their adult son, who has autism and receives government aid. The mother argued that the father, who earns a substantial income, should contribute to their son's support. The father contended that the son's receipt of government aid under the State Supplementary Program for Aged, Blind, and Disabled (SSP) relieved him of any financial responsibility under Family Code section 3910, which mandates parental support for adult children who are incapacitated and without sufficient means.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County ruled in favor of the father, interpreting Welfare and Institutions Code section 12350 to mean that the receipt of government aid barred the mother from seeking child support from the father. The court also limited the attorney’s fees awarded to the mother, reasoning that the case presented a narrow legal issue that did not justify extensive litigation costs.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that Welfare and Institutions Code section 12350 only prevents government entities from seeking reimbursement from relatives for the cost of aid provided to recipients. It does not bar a parent from seeking child support from the other parent under Family Code section 3910. The court emphasized that the legislative intent behind these statutes was to prevent the public from bearing the financial burden of supporting individuals who have relatives capable of providing support.The appellate court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the appropriate amount of child support and to reconsider the attorney’s fees award in light of its ruling. The court clarified that the family court must now address whether the son is incapacitated from earning a living and without sufficient means, and if so, determine the appropriate support amount. View "Marriage of Cady & Gamick" on Justia Law

The case involves Edward Wayne Reid, who was charged with two crimes against Jane Doe: assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury and willfully inflicting corporal injury upon a domestic partner resulting in a traumatic condition. Jane testified that Reid grabbed her by the throat, applied pressure, caused her difficulty in breathing and swallowing, and made her feel dizzy. A deputy corroborated Jane's account, noting she reported seeing stars and feeling faint during the incident.The magistrate at the preliminary hearing found probable cause for the assault charge but dismissed the domestic violence charge, stating there was no evidence of a "traumatic injury." The People refiled the information with both charges, and Reid moved to dismiss the domestic violence charge again. The trial court granted Reid's motion, agreeing with the magistrate's assessment.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing provided a rational ground for assuming Reid inflicted corporal injury upon Jane through choking, which resulted in a traumatic condition as defined by the statute. The court emphasized that the statutory definition of a traumatic condition includes impeding normal breathing or circulation of blood by applying pressure on the throat or neck. The court found that Jane's difficulty in breathing and feeling dizzy or faint met this definition.The appellate court reversed the trial court's order dismissing the domestic violence charge and remanded the case with directions to allow Reid to withdraw his plea to the assault charge. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the charge of willfully inflicting corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition. View "P. v. Reid" on Justia Law

Miriam Penado sought a temporary order of protection for herself and her two minor children in Butte-Silver Bow County Justice Court against Daniel Hunter, the children's father. The Justice Court issued a temporary ex parte order of protection and scheduled a hearing. Subsequently, Hunter filed a parenting plan petition in Gallatin County District Court and moved to remove the protection order case to that court, citing a state statute. The Justice Court transferred the case and vacated the hearing. The Gallatin County District Court then referred the case to a standing master, who set a hearing and maintained the temporary order of protection.Penado filed a motion in the Justice Court to vacate the transfer orders, which was denied. She appealed to the Gallatin County District Court, which also denied her appeal, stating that any appeal should have been made to the Butte-Silver Bow County District Court. The District Court found that Hunter had properly removed the case under the relevant statute. At the subsequent hearing, the District Court granted a one-year order of protection for Penado and allowed Hunter visitation rights.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that the removal of the temporary order of protection case to the Gallatin County District Court was proper under § 40-15-301(3), MCA, which allows either party to remove the matter to district court before or after the hearing. The court found that the statute's language and intent were to consolidate related family law matters in the district court handling the parenting plan. The court also determined that Penado's due process rights were not violated, as she had notice and the opportunity to participate in the hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's final order of protection. View "Penado v. Hunter" on Justia Law