Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant, Eric Honors, was accused of sexually assaulting his sixteen-year-old stepdaughter, B.J., both in the sleeper cab of his semi-truck outside their Wichita, Kansas home and during a subsequent drive from Kansas to Texas. Throughout these events, Honors held B.J. captive, repeatedly assaulted her, and made various videos documenting the abuse. Three such videos were recovered by investigators, all recorded in Kansas; other videos described by B.J. that were made in Oklahoma and Texas were not recovered.Honors was indicted by a federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas on two counts: transportation of a minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity and production of child pornography. At trial, the jury convicted him on both counts. The district court sentenced Honors to a total of sixty years in prison and ten years of supervised release. It also imposed a special condition prohibiting Honors from contacting B.J. or her family, including his wife and four biological children, during supervised release. Initially, the district court declined to extend the no-contact order to his prison term, reasoning it lacked authority, but later reconvened and imposed the order during incarceration as a civil injunction.Honors appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, raising three issues: (1) whether the jury instructions constructively amended the indictment by omitting language limiting the offense to Kansas, (2) whether the district court had authority to impose the no-contact order during incarceration, and (3) whether there was sufficient justification for prohibiting contact with his wife and children during supervised release. The Tenth Circuit held that any error regarding the jury instructions was not plain, affirmed the conviction on Count 2, vacated the custodial no-contact order in its entirety for lack of jurisdiction, and vacated the supervised release condition prohibiting contact with his wife and biological children, finding no compelling justification. View "United States v. Honors" on Justia Law

The biological parents of a minor child, born in January 2018, have a contentious history involving allegations of abuse, criminal charges, and a ten-year order of protection against the father, Daniel Whitby, based on the mother's allegations of assault and rape. The mother, Reina Irene Cazabal-Boe, petitioned for a parenting plan that would exclude Whitby from all contact and visitation with the child, citing safety concerns. Whitby counter-petitioned, alleging drug use and abuse by Cazabal-Boe. A hearing was held in 2018, but Whitby did not attend, and the Standing Master adopted the mother’s proposed plan, giving her sole parenting rights and denying Whitby any contact.Following Whitby’s guilty pleas to various offenses against Cazabal-Boe, he twice sought to modify the parenting plan, alleging changed circumstances such as rehabilitation, sobriety, completion of anger management courses, and psychological evaluations. Both times, the Standing Master—first in 2019 and again in 2025—denied his motions without an evidentiary hearing, finding no change in circumstances affecting the child and awarded attorney fees against Whitby, labeling his repeated motions as vexatious. The Montana Thirteenth Judicial District Court adopted these findings, denying a hearing and refusing to amend the plan.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case, applying abuse of discretion and clearly erroneous standards. It found that Whitby’s affidavits, if true, plausibly alleged a change in circumstances that required a hearing under Montana law. The Court held that the District Court erred by denying a hearing and by awarding attorney fees without proper findings. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s denial of a hearing, vacated the merits denial of amendment, and remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine if modification of the parenting plan is warranted, also reversing the attorney fees award. View "In re Parenting of A.M.B." on Justia Law

C.M.B., a child born in 2018, was removed from her mother’s care following repeated reports and incidents of domestic violence, substance abuse, and unsafe conditions in her home. Law enforcement and Child and Family Services (CFS) intervened after a particularly concerning event in May 2023, finding the home unsanitary and the children exposed to potentially violent situations. Over several years, the family had been subject to multiple investigations for neglect and abuse. After removal, C.M.B. and her siblings were placed in foster or kinship care. The mother was unable to consistently participate in visits or comply fully with her treatment plan, partially due to her own legal and housing difficulties.The Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, adjudicated C.M.B. as a youth in need of care and granted temporary legal custody to the Department. The mother stipulated to the initial petition but later struggled to engage with required services. After extensive proceedings, including testimony from therapists and social workers, the district court found that the mother did not provide a safe or stable home, failed to make meaningful progress on her treatment plan, and that her conditions were unlikely to change within a reasonable time. The court terminated parental rights and granted permanent legal custody to the Department.On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, the mother challenged both her standing to assert ineffective assistance of counsel claims on behalf of C.M.B. and the district court’s findings regarding her ability to change. The Supreme Court held that the mother lacked standing to assert C.M.B.’s statutory and constitutional rights to counsel, as she did not show a personal constitutional violation. Additionally, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in terminating parental rights, finding the decision supported by substantial evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed the termination and permanent custody order. View "In re C.M.B." on Justia Law

After the dissolution of their marriage, Jane and Kenton Girard became involved in prolonged legal proceedings regarding custody of their two minor children. Following Kenton's remarriage to Marissa Girard, the Illinois state court added Marissa as a party to the postjudgment custody dispute in 2023. The situation grew more complicated when Kenton filed a cross-claim against Marissa over a postnuptial agreement, which he argued did not obligate him to indemnify her for legal expenses or lost earnings related to the custody litigation. Marissa responded by removing the entire case to federal court, asserting the existence of a federal question.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois reviewed the removal and determined that the case did not present a federal question. The court found that the dispute revolved around state-law issues of contract and domestic relations, and therefore remanded the case to state court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Marissa appealed this remand order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. However, the Seventh Circuit dismissed her appeal, noting that remand orders are generally not appealable unless the case was removed under specific statutory provisions, which did not apply here.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit then addressed a motion for sanctions under Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, filed by Jane Girard. The court held that Marissa’s appeal was frivolous, both because removal to federal court was unwarranted and because the remand order was not appealable. The court awarded Jane damages in the amount of $2,808.75 for fees and costs incurred in defending the appeal. View "Girard v. Girard" on Justia Law

A county child welfare agency initiated proceedings to terminate a mother's parental rights to her twins, who had been removed from her care at around six months old. The mother was assigned counsel but had not communicated with her attorney prior to the fact-finding hearing. At the hearing, the mother appeared remotely, while her attorney was present in person. The attorney informed the Family Court that he had not discussed the case with his client and intended to remain silent. The court instructed him to participate regardless. Only after the hearing began did counsel request time to speak with the mother. During the proceedings, the mother attempted to represent herself but expressed confusion about the process and later asked to be represented again. The court denied her renewed request for representation and allowed only brief opportunities for her and counsel to communicate.The Family Court determined that the mother had permanently neglected her children and proceeded to the dispositional phase, ultimately terminating her parental rights in favor of adoption by the foster family. The mother appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed the Family Court's decision, finding that the mother had not been denied effective assistance of counsel and that her waiver of counsel was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and concluded that the mother was deprived of her right to the effective assistance of counsel. The Court held that, in proceedings to terminate parental rights, the right to assigned counsel necessarily includes the right to effective assistance of counsel. The Court found that counsel’s failure to communicate with the mother prior to the hearing, and to request an adjournment to do so, lacked any strategic or reasonable justification, thus rendering the representation ineffective and undermining the fairness of the proceedings. The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division and remitted the matter to Family Court for a new hearing. View "Matter of Parker J." on Justia Law

After separating from his wife Monique in 2016, Brett, a sculptor, was ordered in a dissolution proceeding to pay spousal and child support. Brett accumulated approximately $2 million in unpaid support obligations and, according to his own testimony, held no assets apart from a copyright in certain works associated with Michael Jackson. Monique moved to have a receiver appointed and to compel Brett to assign the copyright to the receiver for purposes of monetization to satisfy the outstanding support debt.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Monique’s request, appointing a receiver and ordering Brett to assign his copyright to that receiver. Brett did not dispute his debt or the fact that his copyright was his only asset but argued that existing law did not authorize courts to compel the assignment of a copyright, contending that such authority existed only for patents. He timely appealed from this order.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that, under Code of Civil Procedure section 695.010, subdivision (a), all property of a judgment debtor, including copyrights, is subject to enforcement of a money judgment unless a specific exception applies. The court found no exception for copyrights. It further reasoned that although no published California case had previously addressed forced assignment of copyrights, statutes and past cases regarding other intellectual property, such as patents, supported the trial court’s authority. The court also found persuasive support in analogous federal and out-of-state decisions. Consequently, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order compelling Brett to assign his copyright to the receiver and denied Monique’s request for appellate sanctions. Respondent was awarded costs on appeal. View "In re Marriage of Strong" on Justia Law

After the divorce of two parents, the mother filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County seeking protection from child abuse on behalf of their minor children. She alleged threats of violence and mental injury, but did not check boxes for physical abuse nor provide detailed factual allegations in the petition. At an ex parte hearing, she testified about incidents where the father allegedly struck one child and threatened violence, which led the circuit court to grant a temporary protective order. The court referred the matter to the Department of Social Services for investigation and scheduled the final protective order hearing beyond the statutory seven-day period to accommodate the investigation. At the final hearing, both parties appeared, and the court ultimately granted a final protective order, awarding custody to the mother and imposing supervised visitation and other conditions on the father.On appeal, the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the circuit court’s grant of the final protective order. It held that the extension of the temporary order for investigative purposes was justified, that the father had received adequate notice of the allegations via the temporary order itself, and that there was sufficient evidence to support the circuit court’s finding of abuse. The appellate court relied primarily on the circuit court’s negative credibility determination of the father’s testimony to uphold the order.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case. It held that the father did not preserve for appellate review the issue of whether the circuit court erred by not stating on the record whether good cause existed for scheduling the hearing beyond seven days. The court also held that service of a temporary protective order generally satisfies procedural due process requirements; the father’s argument that service of the petition was required was rejected. However, the Supreme Court found the Appellate Court erred in affirming the sufficiency of the evidence solely based on the circuit court’s disbelief of the father’s testimony. That part of the appellate decision was vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Clarke v. Gibson" on Justia Law

In March 2015, Henry J. Lugo III signed a voluntary declaration of paternity (VDOP) identifying himself as the biological father of a child, and this declaration was filed with the Department of Child Support Services. In 2023, the County of Los Angeles initiated a child support action against Lugo based on the VDOP. Lugo denied being the child’s father and subsequently, after the trial court entered an order and a judgment requiring him to pay child support, he filed a request to set aside the VDOP on the ground of fraud, alleging he had been misled about the child's paternity and supported this with DNA evidence indicating he was not the biological father.Previously, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Lugo’s request to set aside the VDOP as untimely, reasoning that under the current version of Family Code section 7576, such a challenge must be brought within two years of the VDOP’s filing. Lugo argued that, according to Judicial Council form FL-281, which interprets the statute, the applicable time frame for VDOPs filed before January 1, 2020, is within six months after an initial court order for custody, visitation, or child support is made based on the VDOP. The trial court rejected this argument, finding the request untimely since Lugo filed it more than nine years after the VDOP was executed.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and held that for VDOPs filed before January 1, 2020, a request to set aside may be timely filed under the time frame permitted by former Family Code section 7575, subdivision (c)(1). Specifically, the request is timely if brought within a reasonable time, not exceeding six months, after an initial court order for custody, visitation, or child support based on the VDOP. Because Lugo filed his request within this period, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the matter for consideration of the request’s merits. View "County of Los Angeles v. Lugo" on Justia Law

A married couple with two minor children experienced significant changes in their financial and professional circumstances during their marriage. The husband started several businesses, including an insurance agency and other ventures with local investors. In early 2023, he faced serious legal and regulatory issues, including a large default judgment and revocation of his insurance and gaming licenses, followed by criminal indictments. Amid these developments, the wife discovered evidence of his extramarital affair and initiated divorce proceedings, seeking an equitable division of marital property and debts. During the divorce, the husband retained counsel and used marital funds to commence a lawsuit against his former business partners to recover money he had invested in their shared businesses.The divorce case was tried in the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Lincoln County, South Dakota. Both parties disputed the classification and valuation of assets, notably the pending lawsuit. The husband argued that the lawsuit should be treated as his separate property due to an alleged pretrial agreement. The wife disputed the existence of such an agreement and asserted that the lawsuit was a marital asset. The circuit court found no binding agreement on the lawsuit’s classification, treated the pending lawsuit as marital property, valued it at $350,000 based on the invested retainer and a percentage of the claimed amount, and assigned it to the husband.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. It held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in classifying the pending lawsuit as marital property subject to equitable division. The Supreme Court found that the valuation of the lawsuit was not clearly erroneous, as it reasonably reflected the evidence presented at trial. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s decisions regarding classification and valuation, and granted the wife’s request for appellate attorney fees. View "King v. King" on Justia Law

The case involves two parents, Staiger and Johnson, who were never married but share one minor child. The original judgment awarded primary residential responsibility to Johnson, with Staiger receiving scheduled parenting time. Following Johnson’s DUI arrest—during which the child was present—Staiger sought to obtain primary residential responsibility, or alternatively, equal parenting time and joint decision-making. Staiger also requested modifications to safety measures in the parenting plan and the removal of certain alcohol testing requirements for himself. Johnson, as a result of her DUI, was required to participate in a sobriety program and begin mental health services.Previously, the District Court of Morton County, South Central Judicial District, modified the parenting plan to include a graduated visitation schedule for Staiger, alcohol testing requirements, and behavioral conditions. Upon Johnson’s DUI conviction, Staiger moved for further modification. The district court found that Johnson’s DUI incident did not constitute a material change in circumstances warranting a change in primary residential responsibility, noting there was no evidence the child was harmed or suffered a decline in welfare. The court did, however, modify the parenting plan to add alcohol and mental health restrictions for Johnson and removed one of Staiger’s alcohol testing requirements. Staiger’s subsequent motions for reconsideration and clarification were denied.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the district court’s findings under the clearly erroneous standard. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s determination that Johnson’s DUI did not rise to the level of a material change in circumstances affecting the child’s welfare, and that the modifications to the parenting plan were supported by the record. The Supreme Court also upheld the denial of Staiger’s motions for reconsideration and clarification, finding no abuse of discretion. Johnson’s request for attorney’s fees was denied. The district court’s second amended judgment and related orders were affirmed. View "Johnson v. Staiger" on Justia Law