Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

David Rodman Ash petitioned to dissolve his marriage with Bree Elliot in September 2022. The Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, issued a decree dissolving the marriage and dividing the marital property on July 13, 2023. Ash moved to amend the decree, arguing that the court had disregarded his labor contributions in constructing a shared home and his poor health and limited future income prospects. The District Court denied his motion on October 2, 2023. Ash appealed the allocation of the marital assets.The District Court awarded 80% of the value of the Eastman Property to Elliot and 20% to Ash. Ash argued that the distribution was inequitable, given his significant nonmonetary contributions to the construction and maintenance of the marital properties. The court found that Elliot had invested $1,150,000 in the Eastman Property, while Ash's interest was valued at $325,385, including his initial investment and documented cash contributions.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that the District Court abused its discretion by diminishing the value of Ash's nonmonetary contributions to the marital estate. The court noted that Ash's labor in constructing the Lodge and maintaining the properties was significant and should have been considered in the distribution of the marital assets. The court also found that the District Court erred by seeking to return the parties to their premarital positions, which is not a factor under Montana law for equitable apportionment.The Supreme Court reversed the distribution of the marital assets and remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "In re Marriage of Ash" on Justia Law

The husband filed for dissolution after 18 years of marriage, disputing whether two adjacent lots were marital property. One lot included the marital home, and the other had a barn for the wife's horse training business. The husband purchased both lots before the marriage, but both were encumbered by loans paid off with a mix of marital and premarital funds. The properties appreciated significantly during the marriage due to market forces. The key issue was whether paying down the loans with marital funds created a marital interest in the properties.The District Court for Washington County concluded that the lots were nonmarital property, except for the marital contributions toward the loan principals. The court awarded the husband the properties and the wife a cash equalization payment for half of the marital contributions. The wife appealed, arguing that the properties should be considered marital due to the use of marital funds to pay down the loans.The Nebraska Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision regarding the land portions of the lots, finding them nonmarital. However, it reversed the decision regarding the barn and other improvements on one lot, classifying them as marital property due to the joint efforts in their construction and operation. The court modified the equalization payment to the wife accordingly.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and adopted the "source of funds" rule, which considers the marital estate's acquisition of equity in the properties through loan paydowns with marital funds. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision regarding the land portions of the lots and remanded the case for a new hearing to determine the equitable division of these properties, considering the source of funds rule. The decision regarding the barn and other improvements was affirmed. View "Stava v. Stava" on Justia Law

The case involves the custody of a minor child, M.M., who was removed from her mother's custody due to the mother's drug use and subsequent arrest. After the mother's death, M.M. was placed with foster parents, A.P.-1 and A.P.-2. The child's maternal aunt, E.L., intervened to seek custody. The West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS) initially opposed E.L.'s intervention, alleging she had assisted in the child's "kidnapping" by the maternal grandmother, an allegation that was later unsubstantiated. E.L. moved from California to West Virginia to be closer to M.M. and was granted visitation rights.The Circuit Court of Putnam County held three permanency hearings and ultimately decided that it was in M.M.'s best interest to be placed permanently with E.L. The court made extensive findings of fact, noting that M.M. had formed a bond with E.L. during visitations and that E.L. could maintain M.M.'s relationships with her biological family. The court also considered that E.L. was well-equipped to meet M.M.'s medical and developmental needs and had no other children in her home, unlike the foster parents who had three other children with varying special needs.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court held that the circuit court had conducted a meticulous best-interest-of-the-child analysis, considering the child's bonds with both the foster parents and E.L., and the ability of E.L. to preserve important familial relationships. The court found no error in the circuit court's placement determination and concluded that the decision to grant permanent custody to E.L. was supported by the evidence and was in M.M.'s best interest. View "In re M.M" on Justia Law

The case involves a mother (Mother) whose parental rights to her children, D.H., M.H., and J.S., were terminated by the Circuit Court of Berkeley County. The Department of Human Services (DHS) received multiple referrals over the years regarding allegations of abuse and neglect against Mother, but initially did not file a petition. The father of D.H. and M.H. filed for a protective order after M.H. disclosed sexual abuse, leading to an administrative action and the appointment of a guardian ad litem (GAL) for the children. Subsequently, the father, with the GAL, filed an abuse and neglect petition alleging physical abuse, substance abuse, and failure to care for the children.The circuit court ordered the DHS to join the petition despite its initial objection. Mother contested the allegations, claiming the children were coached to lie. She requested public funding for an expert to review the children's forensic interviews, which the court denied, finding the expert unnecessary. The court conducted in camera interviews with D.H. and M.H., finding their disclosures consistent and credible. During the adjudicatory hearings, various witnesses, including the children’s therapist and forensic interviewer, testified about the abuse and neglect. The court found the allegations proven by clear and convincing evidence and adjudicated Mother as an abusing and neglecting parent.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case. It held that the circuit court did not violate the separation of powers doctrine by ordering the DHS to join the petition, as both the judiciary and executive branches have overlapping obligations to protect the best interests of children. The court also found no error in denying Mother’s request to hire an expert, as the proposed testimony would not aid the court, which is the trier of fact. The court affirmed the circuit court’s findings of abuse and neglect by clear and convincing evidence and upheld the termination of Mother’s parental rights, noting her failure to acknowledge the full extent of the abuse and neglect. View "In re D.H., M.H., and J.S." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between divorced parents over the custody and visitation rights of their minor children. The plaintiff father was granted sole legal custody of the children, while the defendant mother was given limited visitation rights. The trial court's order allowed the plaintiff to unilaterally suspend the defendant's visitation with their son, R, if he reasonably determined, after consulting with R's therapist, that the visits were causing negative behavioral or emotional consequences for R.The trial court initially granted the plaintiff's motion to modify custody, awarding him sole legal custody and primary physical custody of the children. The court found that the defendant's behavior, including her mistrust and denigration of the plaintiff, negatively impacted the children. The court's order allowed the defendant to have supervised visits with R, which could become unsupervised if the plaintiff approved. However, the plaintiff was also given the authority to suspend the defendant's visitation if he believed it was harming R.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court's order improperly delegated judicial authority to the plaintiff. The court held that a trial court cannot delegate its statutory duty to decide custody and visitation matters to a nonjudicial entity, including a parent. The court emphasized that only the trial court has the authority to modify visitation orders and that delegating this authority to a parent creates a situation ripe for abuse and misjudgment. The court reversed the trial court's order to the extent that it allowed the plaintiff to unilaterally suspend the defendant's visitation rights and remanded the case for further proceedings on this issue. View "R. H. v. M. H." on Justia Law

In this case, the petitioner, Aaron W., appealed an order from the Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia (ICA) that dismissed his appeal of a family court order. The family court had disqualified Aaron W.'s attorney from representing him in a divorce proceeding due to a conflict of interest, as the attorney had previously represented both parties in a related personal injury case. The family court's order included language indicating it was a final, appealable order.Initially, Aaron W. sought a writ of prohibition from the Circuit Court of Kanawha County to prevent the family court from ruling on the disqualification motion, arguing that the family court lacked jurisdiction. The circuit court denied the writ, and the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed, holding that family courts have the authority to disqualify attorneys in cases of conflict of interest.Aaron W. then appealed the family court's disqualification order to the ICA, which dismissed the appeal, concluding that the order was interlocutory and that it lacked jurisdiction over such appeals. Aaron W. subsequently appealed the ICA's dismissal to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the ICA's dismissal, holding that the family court's disqualification order was not a final order because it did not terminate the litigation on the merits. The court explained that the ICA generally does not have appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals, as specified by West Virginia Code § 51-11-4(d)(8). The court also noted that the family court's inclusion of finality language in its order did not transform the interlocutory order into a final, appealable order. Consequently, the ICA correctly dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Aaron W. v. Evelyn W." on Justia Law

Bruce Johnson and Caroline Settino were engaged to be married, with Johnson giving Settino a $70,000 diamond engagement ring and two wedding bands. Johnson also paid for various expenses, including part of Settino's dental implant surgery. However, Johnson ended the engagement after discovering messages on Settino's phone that led him to believe she was unfaithful, although the trial judge found no evidence of an affair. Settino kept the engagement ring and wedding bands, and Johnson did not pay for the second part of Settino's dental procedure.Johnson sued to recover the engagement ring and wedding bands, and Settino counterclaimed for the cost of the dental procedure. The Superior Court judge ruled in favor of Settino, allowing her to keep the engagement ring and one wedding band, and awarded her damages for the dental procedure, including prejudgment interest from the date of Johnson's complaint. The judge found Johnson at fault for ending the engagement based on his mistaken belief of infidelity.The Appeals Court reversed the decision, ruling that Johnson was not at fault and should recover the engagement ring and wedding band. The court also found that prejudgment interest should be calculated from the date of Settino's counterclaim, not Johnson's complaint. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts granted further appellate review.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the concept of fault should not determine the return of engagement rings. The court adopted a no-fault approach, requiring the return of the engagement ring and wedding bands to the donor if the marriage does not occur, regardless of fault. The court also affirmed the need to recalculate prejudgment interest from the date of Settino's counterclaim. The judgment was reversed in part and remanded for recalculation of prejudgment interest. View "Johnson v. Settino" on Justia Law

The case involves Wade Bloedow (Husband) and Nicole Maes-Bloedow (Wife), who married in 2017 and filed for divorce in 2022. The district court granted the divorce, divided the marital property, and ordered Husband to pay child support and temporary alimony. Husband appealed, arguing the district court abused its discretion in property distribution, income calculation for child support, and the award of temporary alimony. He also claimed the court failed to credit him for temporary payments made during the divorce proceedings.The District Court of Sweetwater County initially granted Wife temporary custody of the twins and ordered Husband to pay $3,000 per month in child and spousal support, plus the monthly payment on Wife’s vehicle. The court found Husband in contempt for not paying the full amount and allowed him to purge his contempt by selling marital assets and paying Wife from the proceeds. After a bench trial, the court awarded Wife most of the marital assets and assigned Husband most of the debts, citing his lack of credibility and fraudulent behavior in concealing and dissipating assets.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The court found the district court acted within its discretion in determining the equity in the marital home and awarding Wife $75,000. It also upheld the overall property distribution, noting the district court considered the statutory factors and Husband’s fraudulent actions. The court found no abuse of discretion in the income calculation for child support, as the district court reasonably averaged Husband’s income from 2021 and 2022. The award of temporary alimony was also upheld, as the district court found Wife had a need for support and Husband had the ability to pay. Finally, the court affirmed the district court’s decision on past due support payments, finding the district court properly credited Husband for payments made during the divorce proceedings. View "Bloedow v. Maes-Bloedow" on Justia Law

A couple with older children volunteered to care for the newborn child of an incarcerated mother struggling with methamphetamine addiction. The mother relapsed multiple times, and the couple eventually became the child's guardians. The mother later sought to terminate the guardianship and raise her child, but the guardians had moved out of state with the child, who had become integrated into their family. The guardians sought to adopt the child, while the mother had made significant improvements in her life and wanted to regain custody.The Iowa District Court for Polk County denied the guardians' petition to terminate the mother's parental rights, finding that the guardians' restrictions on visitation and communication justified the mother's lack of contact with the child. The court noted that the guardians had moved out of state without informing the mother or the court, preventing her from maintaining regular contact.The Iowa Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision, finding that the mother had abandoned the child under Iowa Code section 600A.8(3)(b) by failing to maintain substantial and continuous or repeated contact. The court of appeals determined that the guardians had not placed excessive restrictions on the mother's ability to communicate with the child and that the mother had not exerted sufficient effort to maintain contact.The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, concluding that the mother had abandoned the child and that termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of the child. The court noted that the child had become integrated into the guardians' family and that granting the petition for termination would provide the child with stability and permanency. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "In the Interest of J.V., Minor Child" on Justia Law

The petitioner, K.S., sought certiorari review of orders issued by the Circuit Court in proceedings under RSA chapter 169-C. K.S. argued that the trial court erred in several ways, including denying her access to information she claimed she had a right to, relying on a "reasonable efforts" standard instead of the child's best interest, not holding an evidentiary hearing before approving her placement in a residential treatment program, denying her request to be placed with her father, and denying her request to involve her grandmother in family therapy and other meetings.The New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) had filed petitions alleging neglect by K.S.'s parents, leading to K.S. being placed in various out-of-home settings. Eventually, the court granted DCYF legal custody of K.S. and issued a dispositional order finding that returning K.S. to her parents was not in her best interest. K.S. was hospitalized and later placed in a residential treatment program. The court approved these placements and denied K.S.'s requests for reunification with her father and for additional discovery.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and found that many of K.S.'s arguments were moot due to changes in her circumstances, such as her father's surrender of parental rights and her subsequent placements. The court also held that the trial court did not violate K.S.'s due process rights by not holding an evidentiary hearing before approving her placement in an institutional setting, as the established procedures provided sufficient safeguards. The court affirmed the lower court's decisions, concluding that it did not act illegally or unsustainably exercise its discretion. View "Petition of K.S." on Justia Law