Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Lily and Nikhil Patel were married in 2002 and have two children, both born in Georgia. The family moved to California in late 2019, and then to Georgia in July 2023, where the children attended school and the family searched for a new home. In December 2023, Lily took the children to California to visit her family, with plans to return to Georgia, but a disagreement arose regarding the children’s return. This led to conflicting claims by each parent about the circumstances of their separation.In January 2024, Lily filed for a domestic violence restraining order and requested custody of the children in the Superior Court of Orange County, California, which issued temporary orders. She also filed a petition for legal separation in California, requesting custody. Meanwhile, Nikhil filed for divorce in Georgia. Nikhil moved to dismiss Lily’s custody request on jurisdictional grounds under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), and separately moved to dismiss Lily’s petition for legal separation, arguing that California Family Code section 2345 requires the consent of both spouses for legal separation and he did not consent.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three reviewed the family court’s dismissal of Lily’s petition for legal separation. The appellate court held that, under Family Code section 2345, a judgment of legal separation cannot be rendered without the consent of both parties unless the judgment is taken by default. The court found that the family court had inherent authority to dismiss the petition when the statutory consent requirement could not be met. The order dismissing Lily’s petition for legal separation was affirmed, and the court clarified that the family court did not err in dismissing the petition under the record presented. View "In re Marriage of Patel" on Justia Law

The case involves a parent, D.A.D., whose parental rights regarding his child, G.M.H., were challenged following a period of incarceration. D.A.D. and the child’s mother, K.R.H., separated in June 2022. Shortly after, D.A.D. was arrested and later convicted of possessing child pornography, resulting in nearly three years of incarceration. During his imprisonment, D.A.D. made limited attempts to communicate with G.M.H., sending only a few letters and making a small number of phone calls. The divorce judgment provided for supervised parenting time after his release, contingent on D.A.D. providing specific information to K.R.H., which he failed to do.A petition for termination of parental rights and for adoption was filed by K.R.H. and her spouse, D.A.H., in April 2025. The District Court of Grand Forks County, Northeast Central Judicial District, held a hearing and found by clear and convincing evidence that D.A.D. had abandoned G.M.H. and that his conduct, faults, and neglect justified termination of his parental rights. The court cited his lack of meaningful contact and support, both before and during his incarceration, and concluded that there was no reasonable expectation his behavior would change.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its discretionary decision for abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court held that the district court’s finding of abandonment was supported by the evidence and not clearly erroneous. The court also determined that the statutory definition of abandonment, as applied, did not violate D.A.D.’s constitutional rights, as it required consideration of whether failures to communicate or support were without justifiable cause, including incarceration. The order terminating D.A.D.’s parental rights was affirmed. View "Adoption of G.M.H." on Justia Law

Brian Jessop and Lisa Combs are the parents of a young child, B.J.J. After their relationship ended, Lisa moved with B.J.J. from Utah to Rapid City, South Dakota. Brian filed a petition seeking parenting time consistent with the South Dakota Parenting Guidelines, while Lisa opposed unsupervised visitation and requested sole custody and only supervised contact for Brian, citing concerns about his alleged ties to the Fundamentalist Church of Latter-Day Saints (FLDS) and claims of past abuse. Throughout the proceedings, Lisa maintained that Brian’s involvement with the FLDS posed risks to B.J.J., and she also alleged that Brian had raped her, resulting in the child’s conception. Brian denied the allegations of abuse and FLDS involvement, asserting that he had left the church years earlier.The custody matter was heard in the Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Pennington County, South Dakota. Prior to trial, Lisa unsuccessfully sought a continuance due to an unavailable witness and later moved to exclude rebuttal testimony from Brian’s wife, which was also denied. After a bench trial, the circuit court rejected Lisa’s rape allegations and found insufficient evidence that Brian was a current member or follower of the FLDS. The custody evaluator recommended primary physical custody to Lisa but supported unsupervised visitation for Brian. The court awarded joint legal custody, primary physical custody to Lisa, and unsupervised parenting time to Brian, following the Parenting Guidelines.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the circuit court’s rulings. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lisa’s motions for continuance and exclusion of rebuttal testimony, nor did it err in its findings regarding Brian’s lack of FLDS involvement and the rape allegation. The Supreme Court also affirmed the denial of Lisa’s request for attorney fees and declined to award appellate attorney fees. View "Jessop v. Combs" on Justia Law

Kolstad and Claussen are the unmarried parents of two minor children, having lived together for about four years before separating in early 2024. Claussen also has primary residential responsibility for a child from a previous marriage. After their separation, Kolstad initiated a legal action seeking primary residential responsibility and child support for their two children, while Claussen counterclaimed for the same relief. The district court held a bench trial in October 2024, during which Claussen requested either primary or equal residential responsibility.Following the trial, the District Court of Ward County, North Central Judicial District, awarded Kolstad and Claussen equal residential responsibility for their children and ordered Claussen to pay Kolstad $157 per month in child support. The district court found that Claussen’s change in employment was motivated by a desire to parent his children and not to reduce his child support obligation. Kolstad appealed, arguing that the district court failed to make adequate findings regarding two statutory best interest factors: the developmental needs of the children and evidence of domestic violence.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case and applied the clearly erroneous standard to the district court’s factual findings. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s determination that Claussen’s employment change was not intended to reduce his child support obligation. However, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment in part, finding that the district court did not make sufficient findings or provide adequate explanation regarding best interest factors (c) (the children’s developmental needs and the parents’ ability to meet those needs) and (j) (evidence of domestic violence). The Supreme Court remanded the case for further findings and clarification on those factors, instructing the district court to explain its reasoning and to clarify whether the statutory presumption regarding domestic violence applies. View "Kolstad v. Claussen" on Justia Law

The essential facts of this case involve an individual who was convicted in Mississippi state court for failing to pay child support, an offense punishable by up to five years in prison but for which he ultimately received only probation. After repaying the owed child support and completing probation, the individual was later indicted under federal law, specifically 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits firearm possession by anyone previously convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year. The predicate offense for the federal charge was the non-payment of child support.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, the defendant twice moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as applied to him, among other constitutional challenges. The district court denied both motions. The defendant subsequently pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement that preserved his right to appeal the Second Amendment issue, leading to this appeal before the Fifth Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that, under the historical inquiry required by the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, there is no historical tradition supporting the permanent disarmament of a person convicted solely of non-payment of child support, particularly where the debt had been repaid and probation completed. The court rejected the government’s analogy between debtors and thieves, noting that founding-era practices treated debtors differently, allowing for temporary disarmament only until the debt was paid. The Fifth Circuit therefore held that the application of § 922(g)(1) to the defendant violated the Second Amendment and reversed the conviction, remanding for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "United States v. Cockerham" on Justia Law

A married couple in Montana accumulated substantial assets and debts over a 31-year marriage, primarily through farming and related businesses. When the marriage ended, disputes arose over the valuation and distribution of assets, especially a 25% interest in a family ranch partnership held by the husband. The wife, who had managed bookkeeping, sought full financial disclosure, which the husband resisted. The court ultimately found the wife’s expert valuation of the partnership more credible and ordered an equalization payment schedule requiring the husband to pay the wife monthly installments over 17 years, with a provision allowing transfer of the partnership interest if payments were not made.Following the initial decree, the husband failed to make any payments, attempted to unilaterally transfer the partnership interest, and also moved funds from accounts awarded to the wife. During post-judgment proceedings in the Seventh Judicial District Court, the wife uncovered delays, asset transfers, and changes in the partnership agreement that reduced the value and control associated with the 25% interest. The husband argued he had a choice between payments or the transfer, but the court found his actions obstructive and not in compliance with its orders. The court found the partnership interest had been materially altered, making it inequitable for the wife to accept in satisfaction of the judgment.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s rulings, holding that the husband was properly found in contempt for failing to comply with the decree and for obstructive conduct. The Supreme Court also upheld the District Court’s modification of the property distribution, striking the provision allowing transfer of the partnership interest and ordering restoration of funds to the wife. The Court concluded these actions were within the District Court’s equitable powers and supported by the evidence. View "In re Marriage of Steinbeisser" on Justia Law

A married couple underwent in vitro fertilization and created two frozen embryos, signing a written agreement with the IVF provider that specified options for disposing of the embryos in the event of legal separation or divorce. The agreement offered several choices, including discarding the embryos, donating them, or making them available to one partner if desired. The couple selected and initialed the option stating the embryos would be “made available to the partner if he/she wishes.” After the couple separated, the husband sought to have the embryos discarded, while the wife wanted to use them to attempt pregnancy.In the Superior Court of Orange County, the husband filed a motion to discard the embryos, and the wife requested immediate rights to them. Following an evidentiary hearing at which both parties acknowledged the agreement and their signatures, the court found the contract valid, clear, and unambiguous, and awarded the embryos to the wife. The court issued a minute order and later a formal order reflecting this decision.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, determined the order was not directly appealable but exercised its discretion to treat the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate. Reviewing the IVF agreement independently, the appellate court held that when parties have entered a valid contract specifying the disposition of embryos in the event of divorce, that agreement governs. The court found the contract’s language unambiguous and concluded the embryos should be made available to the wife, as specified. The court further found no violation of public policy or constitutional rights and denied the husband’s petition, affirming that the wife was entitled to the embryos under the contract. View "Pham v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Following a divorce, a father was granted supervised visitation with his two minor children. The supervision was to be conducted by a licensed therapist selected by the mother, as the parents could not agree on a supervisor. The therapist, after supervising some visits, suspended the father’s visitation, stating that the sessions could not proceed successfully unless the father admitted to charges of kidnapping and neglect and recognized their impact on his children.The father subsequently filed suit against the therapist, bringing three claims, including one for reckless infliction of emotional distress stemming from the suspension of visitation. In the Superior Court of Santa Cruz County, the therapist moved for summary judgment. The father conceded two of his claims, leaving only the emotional distress claim regarding the suspension of visitation. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the therapist, finding that the claim was barred by the litigation privilege and quasi-judicial immunity, and further concluding that the alleged conduct did not support a valid claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed only the emotional distress claim related to the suspension of visitation. Applying a de novo standard of review, the appellate court held that quasi-judicial immunity bars the claim. The court determined that the therapist was performing a judicial function delegated by the court—specifically, the authority to suspend visitation under the California Standards of Judicial Administration. The opinion found this function to be indistinguishable from those protected by quasi-judicial immunity in prior precedents. As a result, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the therapist. View "Vergara v. Ouse" on Justia Law

The petitioner and real party in interest are the parents of a minor son, Xander. The petitioner, who has primary physical custody, was found in contempt by the Superior Court of Orange County for five alleged violations of custody-related court orders. The contempt findings were based on the petitioner’s unilateral decisions involving Xander’s participation in school sports and orthodontic treatment, as well as scheduling activities that overlapped with the other parent’s visitation time. The central factual disputes involved whether the petitioner’s actions—signing Xander up for sports teams and braces—constituted violations of joint legal custody and scheduling orders.After a high-conflict parentage case, the trial court (Superior Court of Orange County) conducted a contempt proceeding based on an amended Order to Show Cause filed by the real party in interest. Initially, 36 violations were alleged; after dismissal of many counts, a trial was held on five remaining counts. The trial court found the petitioner guilty on all counts, imposing a $10,000 sanction. The findings were largely based on a pattern of the petitioner presenting decisions to the other parent as a fait accompli.On review, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, strictly construed the underlying orders and held that the contempt judgment was unsupported by substantial evidence of willful violation. The court found that the joint legal custody order did not require mutual consent for specific activities and did not prohibit unilateral decision-making, while the scheduling order did not extend to the petitioner’s authorization of Xander’s participation in events scheduled by third parties. The Court of Appeal granted the petition for writ of certiorari and annulled the contempt judgment, concluding that the orders lacked the specificity necessary to support a finding of contempt. The petitioner was awarded costs for the proceeding. View "Houser v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

A young child, Alice, made several allegations of sexual misconduct against her father over the course of multiple years, beginning in 2021. These allegations were investigated on several occasions by county departments of social services, but none found substantiating evidence, and some investigators suspected that Alice’s mother coached her to fabricate accusations. The parents, who never married, were engaged in an ongoing custody dispute. The Carteret County District Court ultimately awarded primary custody to Alice’s father, finding the mother’s denials of visitation willful and her testimony untruthful. Additional reports of abuse were made thereafter, including by Alice’s school counselor and a therapist. These led to further investigations and court actions, but again no evidence of abuse was substantiated.The District Court in Carteret County dismissed a subsequent juvenile petition alleging abuse, neglect, and dependency, relying on the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, finding the issues had already been litigated. The Court of Appeals vacated this order, holding that collateral estoppel precluded relitigation of the previously adjudicated abuse allegations but not new allegations arising after the prior custody and interference proceedings. The appellate court remanded for further proceedings on the new allegations.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case to clarify the application of collateral estoppel. The Supreme Court held that collateral estoppel did not bar the Department of Social Services’ juvenile petition because the Department was neither a party nor in privity with a party to the prior child custody or interference proceedings. Additionally, the prior court findings did not “actually determine” the relevant abuse issues for collateral estoppel purposes. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings, also noting the Department’s conflict of interest in this matter. View "In re A.D.H" on Justia Law