Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Susan Diamond appealed an order denying her request to set aside a judgment in her marital dissolution proceeding. Susan argued that the judgment should be vacated due to duress and mental incapacity during the dissolution process. The Family Code does not define mental incapacity or duress, but the court found guidance in the Probate Code and Code of Civil Procedure, which address an individual's ability to make decisions regarding assets, medical options, and ongoing legal actions.In the lower court, Susan and Troy Diamond were married in 1992 and separated in 2008. Susan filed for dissolution in 2013. Susan's attorney withdrew due to her lack of communication, and she represented herself thereafter. Susan did not appear at the trial in May 2015, leading to an uncontested trial where the court awarded Troy custody of their daughter, child support, and a significant monetary judgment. Susan later sought to set aside the judgment, claiming she was unaware of the trial and was incapacitated due to health issues. Her initial request was denied based on the disentitlement doctrine and lack of evidence of mistake.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court concluded that Susan did not meet her burden to show she was mentally incapacitated or under duress during the dissolution proceedings. The court found that Susan's actions during the relevant period, such as selling her home and handling financial transactions, indicated she understood the nature and consequences of her actions. The court also found no evidence that Troy used threats or pressure to induce Susan not to participate in the proceedings. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that Susan did not establish grounds for relief under Family Code section 2122. View "Marriage of Diamond" on Justia Law

Maile Soon and Jeannine Kammann were married when Soon conceived twins through assisted reproduction. Kammann was actively involved in the prenatal care and visited the twins after birth. However, the relationship deteriorated, and Soon moved out and filed for divorce. Despite the separation, Kammann continued to support the twins. Soon later sought to dismiss Kammann’s parentage claim, arguing that Kammann lacked standing because she was not genetically related to the twins.The district court ruled in favor of Soon, concluding that Kammann’s admission of not being the genetic parent rebutted the presumption of parentage. Kammann appealed, and the New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s decision, holding that Kammann’s statements alone were insufficient to rebut the presumption of parentage.The New Mexico Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that under the New Mexico Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), the presumption of parentage for a spouse when a child is born during a marriage can only be rebutted by admissible genetic testing results. The court emphasized that the best interest of the child is paramount and that genetic testing must be conducted with the consent of both parties or by court order. Since no genetic testing was conducted or admitted, Kammann’s presumption of parentage remained unrebutted. Therefore, Kammann was declared a legal parent of the twins. View "Soon v. Kammann" on Justia Law

David Heileman and Ariel Cahoon were divorced in 2017, with a joint custody agreement for their two children. The agreement allowed Cahoon primary custody and Heileman secondary custody, with a nearly equal division of time. In 2021, Cahoon filed a petition for contempt and modification of the custodial arrangement, seeking full custody. She cited Heileman's out-of-state work, the detrimental effect of the back-and-forth schedule on the children, and his failure to pay child support.The Poinsett County Circuit Court held a hearing where both parties testified. Cahoon argued that the current arrangement was chaotic and detrimental to the children's stability. Heileman testified about his job as a traveling surgical technician and his efforts to maintain his custodial time. The court found insufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of joint custody but modified the custodial schedule due to Heileman's work schedule and the children's school needs. The new schedule significantly reduced Heileman's time with the children. The court also found Heileman in contempt for failing to pay child support and deferred sentencing for 90 days to allow him to pay the arrears.Heileman appealed, and the Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision. Heileman then petitioned the Arkansas Supreme Court for review. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's decision, holding that the circuit court failed to make the necessary finding of a material change in circumstances to justify modifying the joint custody arrangement. The court emphasized that joint custody is favored in Arkansas and that any modification away from joint custody requires a material change in circumstances and a determination that the modification is in the best interest of the child. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The contempt issue was not addressed as the sanctions had not yet been imposed. View "HEILEMAN v. CAHOON" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellant, Roberto E., sought to modify his child support obligations following changes in the custody of his children. Roberto and Lizeth E. were married in 2011 and had one child together, with Roberto adopting Lizeth’s four other children. Their marriage was dissolved in 2017, with Lizeth receiving custody of all five children and Roberto ordered to pay child support. Subsequently, the children were placed in various out-of-home placements due to juvenile court proceedings, with one child, Roberto Jr., eventually placed in Roberto’s custody through a bridge order.The Lincoln County District Court initially modified Roberto’s child support obligations to reflect the custody change of Roberto Jr. but did not account for the other children’s placements in foster care. Roberto filed a complaint to further modify his child support obligations, arguing that the juvenile court’s orders constituted a material change in circumstances and that his child support should be adjusted retroactively.The district court found that it lacked jurisdiction to modify custody for the children still under juvenile court jurisdiction and declined to modify child support retroactively, citing the rule against modifying accrued child support unless equitable estoppel applied. The court also upheld the garnishment of Roberto’s bank account for back child support.Upon review, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision regarding custody but vacated and remanded the decision on child support. The Supreme Court found that the district court should have considered a deviation from the child support guidelines due to the children’s placements in foster care, which would be equitable under the circumstances. The court also vacated the garnishment findings, as they were dependent on the proper determination of Roberto’s child support obligations. View "Lizeth E. v. Roberto E." on Justia Law

Lois and David divorced in 1992, with David ordered to pay child and spousal support. The child support obligation ended in 2001 when their daughter turned 18 and graduated high school, but wage garnishments continued until 2008. In 2021, David sought reimbursement for overpaid child support, claiming he overpaid $46,061.55. Lois opposed, arguing the delay was unreasonable and would cause her financial hardship.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied David's request, finding he did not act timely and his reasons for the delay were insufficient to overcome the prejudice to Lois. The court noted David had previously acted to terminate spousal support but did not do so for child support. The court also found Lois had unclean hands, as she likely knew she was receiving overpayments. However, the court granted David $3,000 in attorney fees as sanctions against Lois for failing to comply with court orders.On appeal, David argued that reimbursement of overpaid child support is mandatory under Family Code section 4007 and that laches should not apply. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court found that the defense of laches did not apply due to Lois's unclean hands but disagreed with David's interpretation of Family Code section 4007. The court noted that the original support order did not require Lois to notify David of the termination of the child support obligation, and it was David's responsibility to terminate the wage garnishment order. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying David's request for reimbursement due to the significant delay and resulting prejudice to Lois. View "In re Marriage of Saraye" on Justia Law

Shahriyar Shayan appealed an order denying his motion to quash a writ of execution for attorney fees filed by Zohreh McIntyre Shayan. The couple married in 2002, had two children, and Zohreh petitioned for dissolution in 2007. In 2010, the family court awarded Zohreh $125,000 in attorney fees. In April 2022, Zohreh sought a writ of execution on the judgment, which Shahriyar contested, arguing it had expired under the 10-year limitation of Code of Civil Procedure section 683.020 and was not renewed as required by section 683.130.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Shahriyar's request to set aside the writ, leading to his appeal. Shahriyar contended that the attorney fees judgment should be subject to the 10-year limitation and renewal requirements, and that Family Code section 291’s exemptions did not apply to such judgments.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Family Code section 291, which exempts money judgments entered under the Family Code from the 10-year limitation and renewal requirements, includes judgments for attorney fees. The court found the language of Family Code section 291 unambiguous and supported by legislative history, which aimed to simplify enforcement rules for family law judgments and protect litigants' rights. The court affirmed the lower court's order, concluding that the judgment for attorney fees was enforceable until paid in full and did not require renewal. View "In re Marriage of Shayan" on Justia Law

The petitioner, J.F., appealed the Circuit Court of Kanawha County's order terminating his parental rights to his children, C.F. and T.F. The case began when the Department of Human Services (DHS) filed an abuse and neglect petition against J.F. after he was arrested for various charges, including child neglect. The petition alleged that J.F. had committed acts of domestic violence and verbal abuse in the presence of C.F. T.F. was living with his paternal grandparents under a legal guardianship at the time. The petition included historical allegations of domestic violence involving T.F.'s mother, M.H., and J.F., but no recent allegations involving T.F.The Circuit Court adjudicated J.F. as an abusive and neglectful parent and found both children to be abused and neglected. At the disposition hearing, the court terminated J.F.'s parental rights, citing his incarceration and denial of the abuse, which prevented DHS from providing remedial services. The court also denied J.F. post-termination visitation with his children.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case. The court found that the Circuit Court failed to make specific findings regarding T.F. being an abused or neglected child, as required by West Virginia Code § 49-4-601. The court noted that T.F. was living with non-abusive guardians and that the allegations of domestic violence involving T.F. were outdated. Consequently, the court vacated the Circuit Court's adjudicatory and dispositional orders concerning T.F. and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine if T.F. met the statutory definition of an abused or neglected child.The court affirmed the termination of J.F.'s parental rights to C.F., agreeing with the lower court's findings that the conditions of abuse and neglect were unlikely to improve due to J.F.'s denial of the circumstances. The court also upheld the denial of post-termination visitation, finding no evidence of a close emotional bond between J.F. and his children or that continued contact would not be detrimental to their well-being. View "In re C.F. and T.F." on Justia Law

This case involves child custody proceedings between Isaac William Hess and Lisa Ann Hess, who have two minor children registered as members of the Cherokee Nation. Isaac alleged that Lisa abused the children by spanking them with a PVC pipe and claimed she was a negligent mother. During the proceedings, Isaac's father was briefly granted emergency guardianship by the District Court of the Cherokee Nation, but the case was dismissed due to jurisdictional issues. The Idaho magistrate court awarded Lisa sole physical custody and joint legal custody with final decision-making authority, and ordered Isaac to pay child support backdated to January 1, 2021.Isaac appealed to the district court, arguing that the magistrate court erred by not consulting with the Cherokee Nation court regarding jurisdiction, failing to refer his child abuse allegations to the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (DHW), focusing on only one statutory factor in awarding custody, effectively granting Lisa sole legal custody without proper findings, and backdating the child support award. The district court affirmed the magistrate court's decisions on jurisdiction, the child abuse referral, and physical custody, but Isaac appealed further.The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court's decisions on jurisdiction, the child abuse referral, and physical custody. The court held that the magistrate court correctly determined it had jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) and that Isaac's allegations did not constitute child abuse under Idaho law. However, the court reversed the district court's affirmation of the magistrate court's decisions on legal custody and backdated child support. The magistrate court's legal custody decision was found to be internally contradictory, and its decision to backdate child support deviated from the Idaho Child Support Guidelines without explanation. The case was remanded for further proceedings on these issues. The court also awarded Lisa partial attorney fees for responding to Isaac's jurisdictional argument. View "Hess v. Hess" on Justia Law

An infant child, G.K., suffered grievous injuries while in the legal custody of the Louisiana Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) and under the physical care of foster parent Samantha Gafford. Brittany Howe, G.K.'s biological mother, filed a lawsuit individually and as natural tutrix of G.K. against Gafford and DCFS. The plaintiffs alleged that DCFS had a non-delegable duty of care towards G.K. and was liable for the actions of the foster parent.The trial court granted DCFS's motion for summary judgment, agreeing with DCFS's argument that the non-delegable duty was effectively overturned by the case Kunath v. Gafford and that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding Gafford's employment status with DCFS. The Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, affirmed the trial court's decision, reasoning that Louisiana Revised Statute 42:1441.1 prohibited DCFS from being held liable for the actions of foster parents unless the foster parent was an official, officer, or employee of the state.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that DCFS has a non-delegable duty of care and well-being owed to children in its legal custody, which cannot be abrogated by La. R.S. 42:1441.1. The court clarified that this duty is distinct from vicarious liability arising from a master-servant relationship and is an affirmative duty owed by the state. The court concluded that the statute does not apply to the duty of care DCFS owes to children in its custody. Consequently, the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "HOWE VS. GAFFORD" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between two former spouses, Jennifer Knapp and Timothy Dasler, who have a minor daughter together. After their divorce, Dasler engaged in extensive litigation against Knapp, including multiple appeals, motions, and lawsuits in various courts. Knapp sought an order restricting Dasler from engaging in abusive litigation, arguing that his filings were intended to harass and burden her.The Windsor Unit, Family Division of the Superior Court issued a final divorce order in August 2018, awarding Knapp primary custody of their daughter. Dasler appealed this order, but it was affirmed. He continued to file various motions and appeals, including attempts to modify custody and hold Knapp in contempt, all of which were denied. Dasler also initiated lawsuits in New Hampshire and federal courts, which were dismissed. In March 2023, Knapp moved for sanctions against Dasler, claiming his filings were abusive, but the court denied the motion.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the family division’s order restricting Dasler from engaging in abusive litigation. The court found that Dasler’s repetitive filings were made to harass and intimidate Knapp, meeting the criteria for abusive litigation under 15 V.S.A. § 1181. The court concluded that Dasler’s actions, including attempts to relitigate final orders and filing numerous motions for reconsideration, were abusive. The order restricted Dasler from filing motions or engaging in litigation against Knapp unless represented by a licensed attorney or with prefiling approval from the court. The court also dismissed Dasler’s pending motions as abusive and denied his claims that the court erred in its factual findings and procedural rulings. View "Knapp v. Dasler" on Justia Law