Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, Kelly O. Orgeron, sought a community property share of $16,949,000 in liquidated damages paid to her ex-husband, Edward J. Orgeron, Jr., upon the termination of his employment as a college football coach in 2021. The liquidated damages were a contractual benefit guaranteed by his employer, Louisiana State University (LSU), effective January 14, 2020, before the defendant filed for divorce on February 26, 2020. The agreements relevant to this case included a Binding Term Sheet, an Employment Agreement, and a Termination Agreement, all of which had provisions regarding liquidated damages upon termination without cause.The trial court did not award the plaintiff a share of the liquidated damages, interpreting the January 2020 Binding Term Sheet as an agreement to agree rather than a binding contract. The Court of Appeal, First Circuit, upheld this decision.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court erred in its interpretation. The court held that the January 2020 Binding Term Sheet was a binding and enforceable contract, and the subsequent Employment Agreement continued and confirmed the termination-without-cause provisions. Both agreements were effective during the existence of the community property regime between the plaintiff and the defendant, making the liquidated damages a community asset.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed the district court's judgment in favor of the defendant and rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, awarding her a one-half share of the net liquidated damages, amounting to $8,134,500. View "Orgeron v. Orgeron" on Justia Law

Edward Conant Gartrell, Jr. and Sharon Smith Gartrell were divorced by a 2023 judgment of the Madison Circuit Court, which denied Sharon's request for periodic alimony. Sharon appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying her alimony request. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the divorce judgment in part but reversed the denial of periodic alimony, remanding the case for reconsideration under § 30-2-57. On remand, the trial court again denied Sharon's request for periodic alimony, finding she failed to prove her need and the husband's ability to pay without undue hardship.Sharon appealed again, arguing the trial court erred by not reserving jurisdiction to award periodic alimony in the future. The Court of Civil Appeals, in a plurality opinion, affirmed the denial of periodic alimony but agreed that the trial court should have reserved jurisdiction, citing the potential for Sharon's financial circumstances to change. The dissenting opinion argued that § 30-2-57(c) provides the only circumstances under which a court can reserve jurisdiction, implying that the common law allowing broader discretion had been abrogated.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case to address whether § 30-2-57(c) limits the circumstances in which a trial court can reserve jurisdiction to award periodic alimony. The court held that § 30-2-57(c) does not provide the only circumstances for reserving jurisdiction. Instead, it requires reservation in specific circumstances but does not preclude the court's common-law authority to reserve jurisdiction when justice requires it. The court affirmed the Court of Civil Appeals' judgment, allowing the trial court to reserve jurisdiction to award periodic alimony in the future if warranted by changing circumstances. View "Ex parte Gartrell" on Justia Law

In this case, Matthew M. Jaksha and Jessica L. Jaksha's marriage was dissolved in 2017, with a stipulated decree awarding joint legal and physical custody of their minor child. In 2020, a modification awarded Matthew sole legal custody, while Jessica retained decision-making over the child's religious upbringing. In 2021, another modification granted Matthew sole legal and physical custody, with a tiered parenting plan for Jessica's supervised and unsupervised parenting time, contingent on her sobriety.Jessica filed a complaint to modify in 2023, citing her sustained sobriety, but the district court dismissed it, finding no material change in circumstances. Jessica did not appeal this decision but instead filed a complaint in 2024 to vacate or amend the 2021 modification order, arguing it was not a final order and should be relitigated.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the 2021 modification order was final as it resolved all issues raised in the modification pleadings. The court also found that the district court correctly refused to vacate or modify the order, as Jessica's complaint was filed long after the term in which the order was entered, and she failed to establish grounds under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2001(4) or any equitable basis for vacating the order. The court also declined to consider Jessica's argument that the order was void as against public policy, as it was raised for the first time on appeal. View "Jaksha v. Jaksha" on Justia Law

Nicholas Roddy Ramlow and Amanda Marie Mitchell share custody of their minor son. The magistrate court had jurisdiction over their child custody case since 2016. In 2020, a temporary order was issued for the child to attend Kindergarten at Winton Elementary in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. The parents later entered into a custody agreement that did not specify the child's school. In 2021, Mitchell moved to Pinehurst, Idaho, and enrolled the child in Pinehurst Elementary without informing Ramlow, who was under a no-contact order. Ramlow discovered the change in 2023 and attempted to enroll the child in Bryan Elementary in Coeur d'Alene, but the school secretary, Miriam McBenge, refused without both parents' consent or a court order.Ramlow filed a petition for declaratory judgment and a writ of mandamus in the district court to allow the child's enrollment in Coeur d'Alene. The district court dismissed the petition under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(8), citing the ongoing child custody case in the magistrate court. Ramlow argued that the district court erred in its dismissal. McBenge and Mitchell requested the district court's decision be affirmed.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal, agreeing that the magistrate court was better positioned to resolve the issue of the child's school enrollment due to its ongoing jurisdiction over the custody case. The court noted that the district court acted within its discretion and followed the appropriate legal standards. The case was remanded to the district court to amend the judgment to reflect a dismissal without prejudice. Additionally, the court awarded attorney fees on appeal to Mitchell under Idaho Code section 12-121, as Ramlow's appeal was deemed frivolous and without foundation. View "Ramlow v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Spencer Sharpe (Father) appealed a district court order denying his motion to hold Amy Evans (Mother) in contempt for allegedly withholding his parenting time and excluding him from their children's medical decisions. The parties divorced in 2018, agreeing to share custody, with Mother having final decision-making authority and discretion to withhold Father's parenting time if his mental health was not properly managed. In 2021, both parties sought to modify custody, and the district court found Mother had unreasonably denied Father visitation. The court modified the custody order and held Mother in contempt for past violations.Mother appealed the modification, and the Wyoming Supreme Court upheld the modification but reversed the contempt finding, citing ambiguity in the decree. While the appeal was pending, an incident occurred where Mother took one child from Father's home after an argument, leading to further legal disputes. The district court found Mother in contempt for not allowing supervised visits but did not hold her in contempt for other denials of parenting time due to lack of evidence of Father's compliance with required psychological evaluations.Father filed another motion for contempt, claiming Mother continued to deny his parenting time and interfered with medical decisions. The district court found no willful contempt by Mother and ordered Father to undergo a new psychological evaluation. Father appealed, arguing constitutional violations and ADA issues, but these arguments were not raised in the lower court or pertained to orders not currently under appeal.The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order, finding no error in denying the contempt motion. The court also granted Mother's request for attorney's fees and costs, citing the lack of reasonable cause for the appeal and the absence of cogent argument and relevant legal authority in Father's brief. View "Sharpe v. Evans" on Justia Law

A.L.U. was born to Rozlyn Bluemel and Tyler Uhrich in March 2020. After Rozlyn and Tyler became estranged, Tyler murdered Rozlyn in May 2022. Following the murder, the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services placed A.L.U. in the care of her paternal grandparents, Ashley and Vijay Uhrich, who later adopted her. After the adoption, the Uhrichs terminated all visitation between A.L.U. and her maternal grandmother, Sharline Bluemel. Sharline then filed a petition for grandparent visitation, seeking increased visitation time with A.L.U.The Twentieth Judicial District Court, Lake County, granted Sharline's petition in part, allowing her limited supervised visitation with A.L.U. The court found that maintaining a connection with her maternal grandmother was in A.L.U.'s best interest, despite the objections of the Uhrichs. The court set a visitation schedule for Sharline to have four-hour supervised visits with A.L.U. once every two months.The Uhrichs appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, arguing that the District Court erred by not properly applying the statutory presumption in favor of their wishes as fit parents. They contended that the court improperly substituted its judgment for theirs regarding A.L.U.'s best interests.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court's decision. The court held that the District Court correctly applied the statutory standard and found clear and convincing evidence that limited contact with Sharline was in A.L.U.'s best interest. The court noted that the District Court's findings were supported by substantial evidence and that the visitation schedule was reasonable and addressed the Uhrichs' concerns by requiring supervised visits at agreed-upon locations. View "Grandchild visitation of A.L.U." on Justia Law

The case involves the termination of parental rights of K.M. and E.R., Sr. to their four eldest children, J.R., E.R., A.R., and D.R. The Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) became involved after the fourth child tested positive for cocaine at birth in March 2016. All four children were removed from the home and never returned. The parents were referred to various programs and services, but they showed minimal progress and compliance, leading to the filing of termination of parental rights (TPR) petitions in August 2017. Despite some progress in later years, including reunification with their two youngest children through the Safe and Secure Baby Court (SSBC), the parents never progressed to unsupervised or overnight visits with the four eldest children.The Family Court terminated the parental rights of K.M. and E.R., Sr. after a trial that spanned several weeks and included testimony from multiple witnesses. The trial justice found that the parents were unfit, that DCYF had made reasonable efforts to reunify the family, and that termination was in the best interests of the children. The parents appealed, arguing that the trial justice erred in these findings and in admitting the guardian ad litem (GAL) report.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Family Court's decrees. The Court found that the trial justice's findings were supported by clear and convincing evidence, including the parents' lack of compliance with service plans and the children's need for a permanent home. The Court also held that the admission of the GAL report, although hearsay, was harmless error given the overall evidence supporting the termination. The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of the children's best interests and the significant progress the parents had made, but ultimately upheld the termination of parental rights. View "In re J.R.; In re E.R.; In re A.R.; In re D.R" on Justia Law

Sunday Adeyeye, a U.S. citizen, signed an I-864 affidavit of support for his spouse, Adebukola Faramaye, a Nigerian citizen, as a condition of her immigration to the United States. The affidavit required Adeyeye to maintain Faramaye’s income at no less than 125 percent of the federal poverty guidelines. After filing for divorce, Adeyeye was ordered by the trial court to pay $1,569 per month in support, corresponding to 125 percent of the federal poverty guidelines, without considering Faramaye’s income.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County granted Faramaye’s request for support based on the I-864 affidavit and ordered Adeyeye to pay $1,569 per month. The court declined to consider Faramaye’s income, reasoning that the sponsor’s obligation under the I-864 affidavit does not terminate until the sponsored immigrant has worked 40 qualifying quarters, among other conditions. Adeyeye appealed, arguing that the court erred by not considering Faramaye’s income and that her request for attorney fees was premature.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court erred by not considering Faramaye’s income when determining Adeyeye’s support obligation under the I-864 affidavit. The appellate court noted that the sponsor’s obligation is to provide any support necessary to maintain the sponsored immigrant at an income of at least 125 percent of the federal poverty guidelines, which requires considering the immigrant’s income. The court reversed the order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, directing the trial court to reconsider Adeyeye’s support obligation by taking into account Faramaye’s income. The issue of attorney fees was not addressed at this time. View "In re Marriage of Adeyeye and Faramaye" on Justia Law

Petitioners, T.S. and G.G., an unmarried couple, sought to jointly adopt T.S.'s biological granddaughter, for whom they have had permanent custody since 2017. They filed a petition in the Jackson Circuit Court, Family Division, with the biological mother's consent. The Cabinet for Health and Family Services issued a report stating that Kentucky statutes do not allow unmarried couples to jointly adopt, leading the family court to dismiss the petition.The family court's decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which held that the statutes do not permit joint adoption by unmarried couples. The court noted that either petitioner could adopt the child individually or they could marry to jointly adopt her. Petitioners then sought discretionary review from the Supreme Court of Kentucky.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case de novo, focusing on whether Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) Chapter 199 prohibits unmarried couples from jointly petitioning to adopt. The court held that the statutes do not bar such adoptions. The court interpreted "any person" in KRS 199.470(1) to include unmarried couples, based on statutory construction principles and the precedent set in Krieger v. Garvin. The court also noted that the Cabinet's regulations cannot contravene the adoption statutes.The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the Jackson Circuit Court, Family Division, instructing the Cabinet to investigate and report on the adoption petition as required by KRS 199.510. View "G.G. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Services" on Justia Law

Hannah and Manish Mehta married in 2000 and had triplets in 2007. Hannah became the primary caregiver, especially for one child with significant medical needs. Manish filed for divorce in 2019. The trial court granted Hannah exclusive use of the marital home and ordered Manish to pay child support and temporary spousal support. Hannah later secured a paid position with a nonprofit. During the divorce proceedings, Manish expressed concerns about Hannah's ability to maintain the home financially. The trial court's final decree included child support and spousal maintenance for Hannah.The trial court appointed Hannah and Manish as joint managing conservators, with Hannah having the right to designate the children's primary residence. Manish was ordered to pay $2,760 per month in child support and $2,000 per month in spousal maintenance for thirty-six months. Manish requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, challenging the spousal maintenance award. The trial court did not provide additional findings, and Manish appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas affirmed the property division but reversed the spousal maintenance award, citing insufficient evidence that Hannah would lack sufficient property to meet her minimum reasonable needs.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the spousal maintenance award. The Supreme Court emphasized that while detailed financial evidence is ideal, courts should not disregard competent qualitative evidence. The court also noted that child-related expenses must be considered when assessing whether a spouse will have sufficient property post-divorce. The Supreme Court found legally sufficient evidence to support the trial court's award of spousal maintenance, including Hannah's role as the primary caregiver for a medically fragile child. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment in part and reinstated the trial court's spousal maintenance award. View "Mehta v. Mehta" on Justia Law