Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Two women, who were never married, were granted joint guardianship of twin girls when the children were very young. After their relationship ended, they continued to share custody through the guardianship. Several years later, both women filed competing adoption petitions. The circuit court granted one woman’s petition, making her the adoptive parent and terminating the guardianship. The other woman’s appeal of the adoption was unsuccessful.While that appeal was pending, the non-adoptive woman filed a petition in the Circuit Court of Jackson County seeking third-party custody or, alternatively, visitation rights under section 452.375.5(5). The adoptive parent moved to dismiss the petition, arguing her former partner lacked standing under the statute. The circuit court denied the motion, and the parties later appeared to reach a settlement, resulting in a proposed judgment granting third-party visitation. The adoptive parent objected before the judgment was entered, but the court signed the judgment granting visitation. When the adoptive parent was found to have violated this judgment, the court awarded compensatory visitation and attorney’s fees to the other woman. The adoptive parent appealed both rulings. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding the non-adoptive woman had standing and that consent to the visitation agreement was binding.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case and held that section 452.375.5(5)(a) does not create an independent cause of action for third-party custody or visitation when custody is not otherwise at issue in an underlying proceeding. The Court determined that a third party may only seek custody or visitation under the statute as part of an already pending custody dispute, not as a stand-alone action following an adoption. The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the lower court’s judgments and dismissed the petition and related family access motion. View "In re A.L.P. and S.H.P." on Justia Law

A married couple jointly petitioned for dissolution of their marriage in Alaska, reaching a written agreement to divide their assets, including the husband’s military benefits and the marital home. At the time of the dissolution, the husband was receiving monthly payments from the Coast Guard, which were described in the petition as “retirement benefits.” Both parties confirmed in court that the agreement was voluntary and fair, and the husband agreed to pay half of his military benefits to his spouse directly. The superior court master found the agreement satisfied statutory requirements and recommended approval, which the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Kodiak, then incorporated into the dissolution decree.After the decree was issued, the husband began labeling payments as both “retirement” and “disability pay.” Upon learning from Coast Guard officials that his payments were actually Combat-Related Special Compensation (CRSC) and not divisible as marital property under federal law, he filed motions challenging the enforceability of the decree, arguing that federal law barred division of his benefits and raising claims of mistake, fraud, and coercion. The Superior Court denied his motions, finding he had voluntarily consented to the division and that his challenges were untimely under Alaska Civil Rule 60(b), as more than one year had passed since the decree. The court also addressed an ancillary dispute regarding removal of the husband’s name from the mortgage of the marital home, ultimately finding both parties responsible for delays and declining to order a forced sale.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the appeal. It held that even if the decree divided benefits contrary to federal law, this did not render the judgment void or entitle the husband to relief under Civil Rule 60(b). The husband’s claims of mistake, fraud, or coercion were time-barred, and no extraordinary circumstances justified relief. The court further determined the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in resolving the mortgage issue. The judgment was affirmed. View "Million v. Hubert" on Justia Law

A child born in 2014, RTT, was placed under the co-guardianship of his maternal grandfather, James Serfoss, III, and Mr. Serfoss’s domestic partner, Leslie M. Salmon, beginning in 2016. The two petitioners are not married. In 2025, RTT’s biological father, Tyler Thomas, sought to terminate the guardianship. In response, Serfoss and Salmon jointly counterclaimed, seeking to adopt RTT. The child’s biological mother consented to the adoption, but the biological father did not.Following the joint adoption counterclaim, Mr. Thomas moved to dismiss, arguing that Wyoming law does not permit two unmarried individuals to jointly petition for adoption. The District Court of Converse County certified the legal question to the Supreme Court of Wyoming, asking whether Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-104(b) allows for a joint adoption petition by two unmarried individuals.The Supreme Court of Wyoming, reviewing the certified question de novo, held that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-104(b) does not permit two unmarried individuals to file a joint petition to adopt a minor child. The statute expressly allows joint petitions only for married couples and does not authorize joint petitions by multiple unmarried individuals. The court emphasized that while each unmarried adult may separately petition for adoption, they cannot file jointly; the district court may, however, consolidate separate petitions for consideration. The court declined to read into the statute any broader authority or to interpret legislative silence as permitting joint petitions by unmarried individuals. The Supreme Court’s answer to the certified question was therefore “no.” View "In the Matter of the Guardianship Of: RTT" on Justia Law

A grandmother, who was the court-appointed guardian of a minor child since birth, sought to terminate the parental rights of the child’s parents and adopt the child. After filing petitions for adoption and termination, the grandmother attempted to obtain parental consent, but the documents submitted did not comply with statutory requirements. The grandmother was unable to locate the parents for proper service of process, despite efforts including communication attempts and seeking assistance from child protective agencies.The Superior Court, Bennington Unit, Probate Division, reviewed the case. It determined that although the grandmother had exercised due diligence, the relevant statute, 15A V.S.A. § 3-403(a), required parents to be “personally served” with process. The probate division interpreted “personal service” to mean only in-hand service or delivery at the parent’s home, excluding service by publication. As a result, the court dismissed the grandmother’s petitions for lack of service.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court considered whether “personally served” under § 3-403(a) precluded service by publication. The Court reviewed statutory interpretation and the Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure de novo. It concluded that the legislative intent was to adopt all forms of “personal service” as defined in Rule 4(d) at the time of enactment, which included service by publication when due diligence to serve by other means fails. The Court found no constitutional bar to service by publication under such circumstances and reversed the probate division’s order dismissing the grandmother’s petition. The Vermont Supreme Court held that service by publication is permitted when the petitioner demonstrates that other forms of service cannot be made with due diligence, and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re O.R.G." on Justia Law

A mother and her husband sought to terminate the parental rights of the biological father to their minor child, K.P., and permit the husband to adopt K.P. The parents had divorced in 2019, with the mother awarded sole legal and physical custody, and the father granted twice-weekly visits. Following the divorce, the mother remarried and moved with K.P., and contact between K.P. and the father diminished. The mother and her husband initially filed an adoption petition in the probate division without serving the father. Years later, the mother served the father with a petition to terminate his parental rights. After consolidation, both the adoption and termination matters were transferred to the family division, which held evidentiary hearings. The father faced obstacles including unstable housing, lack of transportation, mental health issues, and interference from the mother and her husband.After the probate division dismissed its proceedings and the case was consolidated in the Lamoille Superior Court, Family Division, the court appointed counsel for the father and held a hearing. The family division found the father had not exercised parental responsibility for six months before the termination petition, but determined he had good cause due to interference by the mother and her husband and his personal hardships. The court found no clear and convincing evidence that the father was unable or unwilling to provide appropriate care, or that termination was in K.P.’s best interests. The court denied the termination and adoption petitions and ordered gradual reintroduction of father-child contact.The appellants also appealed to the Lamoille Civil Division, which dismissed their appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed both appeals. It held that the civil division correctly dismissed the appeal, as family division orders are appealable only to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court affirmed the family division’s denial of the termination and adoption petitions, finding its factual findings supported and no legal error. View "In re K.P." on Justia Law

A child was removed from the care of their mother in Utah after the mother experienced a mental health crisis, leading to the Utah Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) taking protective custody of the child. The father, living in Georgia, sought custody. The juvenile court ordered DCFS to request a home study from Georgia officials via the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC). Georgia attempted to conduct the home visit twice, but was unable to complete it because the father lacked a stable residence. The court found the child could not safely be returned to the father and ultimately terminated his parental rights.The Second District Juvenile Court in Weber County initially adjudicated the child dependent as to the mother and neglected as to the father due to abandonment, later revising the finding to dependency after the father argued he had been denied access by the mother. Despite the father's efforts to establish paternity and seek visitation, the court maintained the child in DCFS custody with a goal of reunification. After two failed ICPC home studies due to the father's unstable housing, the court changed the permanency goal to adoption and terminated reunification services. DCFS then filed to terminate the father’s parental rights, and after trial, the juvenile court issued an order terminating those rights.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the case on certification from the Utah Court of Appeals. The father argued that his appointed counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the use of the ICPC process or proposing alternatives for the required home visit. The Supreme Court held that counsel’s performance was not objectively unreasonable under the Strickland standard, noting that the ICPC was commonly used in these circumstances and alternatives were impractical or unlikely to be accepted. The court affirmed the termination of the father’s parental rights. View "In re B.G." on Justia Law

A woman alleged that her boyfriend assaulted her during their relationship and filed a petition for protection from abuse (PFA) in Madison Circuit Court. Judge Linda F. Coats, serving as a special circuit-court judge, granted an ex parte protection order and scheduled a hearing. Subsequently, the boyfriend was charged criminally with domestic violence arising from the same incident. At the PFA hearing, Judge Coats held a pretrial immunity hearing under Alabama’s stand-your-ground statute, determined the boyfriend acted in self-defense, and denied the PFA petition, stating he was immune from criminal and civil prosecution.In the criminal case, Judge Patricia D. Demos dismissed the charge against the boyfriend, relying on Judge Coats’s immunity determination from the PFA case. The State, through the Madison County District Attorney’s Office, petitioned the Madison Circuit Court for a writ of mandamus, arguing Judge Coats lacked authority to grant immunity in the PFA proceeding without notice to the State and that Judge Demos erroneously dismissed the criminal charge based on the PFA order. The Madison Circuit Court (Judge Donna S. Pate) granted the writ, ordering Judge Coats to vacate the immunity portion of her PFA order and Judge Demos to reinstate the criminal case.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed appeals by Judge Coats and the boyfriend. The Court held that Judge Coats lacked standing to appeal and that the portion of the circuit court’s mandamus order directed to Judge Coats was void, as Judge Pate did not have supervisory jurisdiction over a special circuit-court judge. The Court dismissed Judge Coats’s appeal and the corresponding part of the boyfriend’s appeal. The remaining portion of the boyfriend’s appeal, which concerned the mandamus to Judge Demos in the criminal case, was transferred to the Court of Criminal Appeals, as it fell under its appellate jurisdiction. View "Coats v. State of Alabama" on Justia Law

A 76-year-old man petitioned to adopt a 40-year-old woman whom he had known for six years. The parties participated in evidentiary hearings, and a court-appointed investigator prepared a report. Testimony revealed inconsistencies regarding the stated purpose of the adoption, particularly concerning the petitioner’s claim that the adoption would allow the adoptee to care for him, despite evidence that the adoptee’s health issues prevented her from working. The court also noted that the adoptee was unaware adoption would sever her legal relationship with her mother, with whom she lived and received financial support. Additionally, concerns arose regarding the petitioner’s mild cognitive impairment and unaccounted trust distributions.The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, reviewed the petition and evidence. The court found that the adoption was not in the best interests of the adoptee, considering the potential negative impact on her relationship with her biological mother, possible contentious inheritance issues, and inconsistencies in the petitioner’s stated goals. The court also considered the medical evidence and concluded the doctor’s report did not sufficiently address the petitioner’s cognitive capacity or awareness of the adoption’s implications. Based on these findings, the court denied the adoption petition.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota applied the clearly erroneous standard to the district court’s factual findings and reviewed the denial of the adoption decree for abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court held that the district court’s findings were not clearly erroneous, nor did the court abuse its discretion or misapply the law. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order dismissing the adoption petition. View "In re Adoption of K.J.K." on Justia Law

A couple who had served as resource parents for a child involved in a protective custody proceeding filed a petition to adopt the child. Their petition was denied by the District Court, which instead granted adoption to another couple. The District Court based its decision on its determination that adoption by the other couple was in the child’s best interest. The resource parents appealed to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, which affirmed the District Court’s decision, finding no clear error or abuse of discretion.Almost a year later, the resource parents filed several motions in the District Court, including a motion under Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) seeking relief from the adoption judgment. They argued that the adoptive parents had fraudulently misrepresented the nature of their relationship during the adoption proceedings and that new evidence supported their claim. The District Court denied these motions with prejudice, later providing a more detailed explanation. The court found the proffered evidence to be either discoverable at the time of trial, related to events occurring after judgment, or insufficient to prove fraud by clear and convincing evidence. The court also declined to hold an evidentiary hearing and ordered the resource parents to pay the adoptive parents’ attorney fees and costs.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the denial of the Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion and the attorney fee award de novo. It concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief from judgment or in declining to hold an evidentiary hearing, as the evidence was either not newly discovered or did not meet the heightened standard for fraud. However, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the portion of the order awarding attorney fees, finding no basis for a sanction, and otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "Adoption by Kathleen C." on Justia Law

A mother sought to terminate the parental rights of the father to their minor child under Pennsylvania’s Adoption Act. The father had been convicted of child-related offenses, including possession of child pornography and failing to register as a sexual offender, resulting in imprisonment and lifetime registration as a sexual offender. Following their divorce, the mother had primary physical custody, while the father had supervised custody, later limited further during his incarceration. The mother filed a petition to involuntarily terminate the father’s parental rights, but she did not indicate that an adoption of the child was contemplated, nor did she intend to relinquish her own parental rights.The Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, Orphans’ Court Division, held a hearing and granted the mother's petition, finding grounds for termination under the Act and invoking the “cause shown” exception in Section 2901 to excuse the lack of a contemplated adoption. The court reasoned that the father’s criminal convictions justified applying the exception so the mother could protect her child. The father appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in excusing the adoption requirement.The Superior Court of Pennsylvania vacated the trial court’s order, holding that the mother’s petition was not cognizable under the Act because she had not demonstrated a contemplated adoption, as required by Section 2512(b)(2). The Superior Court found no legal impediment preventing the mother from meeting statutory requirements, aside from her unwillingness to relinquish her parental rights.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s ruling. The Court held that Section 2901’s “cause shown” exception applies only when there is a contemplated adoption of the child. Since no adoption was contemplated, the mother’s petition was not cognizable under the Act, and the trial court’s termination of the father’s parental rights was erroneous. View "In Re: M.L.R." on Justia Law