Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) in Rhode Island, which was held in contempt by the Family Court for failing to place a minor, N.B., in a specific facility, St. Mary’s Home for Children, as ordered by the court. N.B., who has behavioral issues and Type I juvenile diabetes, was initially placed in Hasbro Children’s Hospital after her mother refused to take her home due to safety concerns. The Family Court ordered DCYF to place N.B. at St. Mary’s, but the facility refused to admit her due to her medical needs and behavioral issues. Despite DCYF's efforts to secure a placement for N.B., including contacting multiple potential placements and attempting to hire nurses to monitor N.B.'s diabetic care needs, no suitable placement was available.The Family Court found DCYF in contempt for failing to place N.B. at St. Mary’s, rejecting DCYF's argument that it was impossible to comply with the placement order. The court ordered DCYF to pay a daily sanction until it complied with the order. DCYF appealed the contempt order, arguing that the Family Court abused its discretion by finding that DCYF had not exercised reasonable efforts to place N.B. and that it was impossible to comply with the placement order.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island vacated the Family Court’s contempt order. The Supreme Court found that DCYF had made substantial efforts to place N.B. at St. Mary’s and other appropriate facilities, but compliance with the placement order was outside the department’s control due to circumstances such as the refusal of facilities to accept N.B. and ongoing nursing shortages related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Supreme Court concluded that the Family Court had abused its discretion in finding that DCYF had not used reasonable efforts to place N.B. and in holding DCYF in contempt. View "In re N.B." on Justia Law

The case involves the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) in Rhode Island, which was held in contempt by the Family Court for failing to place a minor, N.D., in a residential facility appropriate for her level of need. N.D., a teenager with severe mental health issues, was under the temporary custody of DCYF. Despite the court's order, DCYF was unable to find an appropriate in-state or out-of-state placement for N.D. due to her high level of need and the lack of available facilities. The Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) filed a motion to adjudge DCYF in contempt for this failure.The Family Court found DCYF in contempt, rejecting DCYF's defense that it was unable to comply with the court's order. The court imposed a contempt sanction of $1,000 per day until N.D. was placed in an appropriate facility, with the sanction to be placed in a trust for N.D.'s benefit. DCYF appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island vacated the order of the Family Court. The Supreme Court found that while DCYF was in technical violation of the Family Court's order, it had demonstrated that it was literally unable to comply because an appropriate placement for N.D. was not presently within its power. The court noted the lack of appropriate facilities for girls with N.D.'s level of need in Rhode Island, staffing issues, and an increase in mental health problems among adolescents. The case was remanded to the Family Court for further proceedings. View "In re N.D." on Justia Law

In a dispute between Nancy Robayo and Luis Robayo, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the judgment of the Family Court. The case focuses on a marital settlement agreement between the plaintiff, Nancy Robayo, and the defendant, Luis Robayo, who are former spouses. The plaintiff argued that she is entitled to survivor benefits in the defendant's federal civilian pension according to their marital settlement agreement. The agreement was silent on the issue of survivor benefits, leading the court to find it ambiguous in this regard.The Supreme Court concluded that the most equitable construction of the agreement does not entitle the plaintiff to survivor benefits. The court's decision was based on the circumstances of the parties' marriage, their separation, and the context of their agreement. The parties had lived separately in different states for sixteen years during their twenty-eight-year marriage and had acknowledged in their marital settlement agreement that they had not had a "marital relationship" since 2010. The court found that all of the plaintiff's rights to the defendant's pensions ended on June 30, 2018, as stated in the agreement.The Supreme Court also addressed the plaintiff's argument that the trial justice erred in taking judicial notice of defense counsel's experience litigating in the Family Court. The court found that this did not constitute judicial error. View "Robayo v. Robayo" on Justia Law

This case concerns a child custody dispute between Kelly K. Fitzgerald and James W.A. Jackson. The parties have two minor children, who have dual citizenship of the United States and Australia. The children have lived in Rhode Island with the Plaintiff since 2015. The Defendant, an Australian citizen, argued that the Family Court of Rhode Island lacked jurisdiction over the dispute, contending that there was a simultaneous case in Australia and that he had no personal ties to Rhode Island.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the Family Court's decision over the custody dispute, confirming that Rhode Island had jurisdiction over the matter. The Supreme Court confirmed that the Family Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over child-custody cases as a matter of law and that the defendant had waived the issue of personal jurisdiction and consented to jurisdiction in Rhode Island by availing himself of the laws of Rhode Island.The Court found that the Family Court had jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) because Rhode Island was the children's home state at the time the proceedings were commenced, and no other state would have jurisdiction under the criteria specified in the act. The UCCJEA treats a foreign country as if it were a state of the United States for the purpose of applying its provisions. The Court also noted that the Australian court had declined to exercise jurisdiction over the case, further supporting the Family Court's jurisdiction.The Court also rejected the defendant's argument that the Family Court should not have issued orders regarding child support and custody without first making a jurisdictional finding, noting that the defendant himself had filed a motion for custody, participated in mediation, and submitted a form prior to a hearing on child support. The Court concluded that the hearing justice did not err in finding that the Rhode Island Family Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the matter.Finally, the Court concluded that the hearing justice erred in not ruling on the defendant's emergency motion for temporary orders, apparently seeking visitation with the children during the summer, because at the time, no order had been entered divesting the Family Court of jurisdiction, and no appeal had been filed. The matter was remanded to the Family Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Fitzgerald v. Jackson" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the defendant, Laurie Cronan, challenged a divorce judgement entered by the general magistrate of the Family Court. She primarily disputed the magistrate's authority to preside over the contested divorce trial. Additionally, she disagreed with the magistrate's decisions regarding the distribution of the marital estate, the valuation of premarital assets, and the denial of her request for alimony.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the decision of the Family Court. The court found that the issue of the magistrate's authority could have been raised at the trial level but wasn't, hence it was waived on appeal. Regarding the distribution of marital assets, the court found that the general magistrate did not err in determining the value of the plaintiff's equity interest in his medical practice based on the binding shareholder agreement, rather than its fair market value. The court also upheld the general magistrate's decision to deny the defendant's request for alimony, finding that he properly considered all requisite statutory elements and that the defendant would be financially independent and self-sufficient without alimony. Lastly, the court found no error in the general magistrate's valuation of the plaintiff's premarital assets. View "Cronan v. Cronan" on Justia Law

This case involves the appeal of a Superior Court judgment in favor of the intervenor, Isabel DaPina Costa, following the grant of her motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff, Clara Martins, is the mother of Orlando A. Da Cruz who died in 2008. His death certificate referred to Costa as his spouse, but Martins disputed this, claiming Costa was merely Da Cruz's "live-in girlfriend". Martins filed a complaint in Superior Court in 2019 seeking to amend her son's death certificate. Costa intervened, arguing that the applicable statute of limitations, under G.L. 1956 § 9-1-13(a), had expired. The Superior Court granted Costa's motion for summary judgment, and Martins appealed.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. On appeal, Martins argued that her claim was not a civil action and therefore not subject to the statute of limitations under § 9-1-13(a). She pointed to another statute, G.L. 1956 § 23-3-21, which governs the correction and amendment of vital records, as the controlling statute for her claim. However, the Court found that Martins had not raised this argument at the lower court level, and thus it was not preserved for appellate review. Even if it had been preserved, the Court would have held that § 9-1-13(a) applies to her claim.The Court noted that while some requests to amend vital records may not be subject to a statute of limitations, not all such requests require the commencement of a civil action. In this case, Martins had commenced a civil action by filing her complaint in Superior Court, and as such, her claim was subject to the statute of limitations under § 9-1-13(a). Therefore, her complaint was barred by this statute. View "In re Da Cruz" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the family court trial justice affirming the decision and order entered by the General Magistrate of the family court granting Plaintiff's motion to relocate permanently to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts with the parties' minor child, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff filed this action and an ex parte motion seeking temporary custody and physical possession of the parties' child. The court granted the motion, after which Plaintiff filed a verified emergency motion to relocate to Massachusetts. The family court granted the emergency motion to relocate. The general magistrate granted the motion to relocate, and the family court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the family court did not erroneously affirm the general magistrate's decision and order concluding that allowing Plaintiff to relocate permanently to Massachusetts was in the child's best interests. View "Dawson v. Ojeda" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the family court terminating Mother's parental rights with respect to her daughter (Child), holding that the trial justice did not err in finding by clear and convincing evidence that the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) made reasonable efforts to achieve reunification between Mother and Child.DCYF filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights on the grounds that she and Father were unfit to parent Child under R.I. Gen. Laws 15-7-7(a)(2)(i) and (a)(3). After a trial, the trial justice granted DCYF petition to terminate Mother's parental rights, determining that DCYF met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that it employed reasonable efforts to achieve reunification. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not clearly error or overlook or misconceive material evidence in determining that DCYF made reasonable efforts to achieve reunification. View "In re R.M." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the orders of the family court reopening a divorce case finalized by the family court more than two decades ago and awarding Steven Capaldi a portion of his pension to Anne Farrer, holding that the trial justice's decision granting Anne's motion for relief was incorrect as a matter of law.In 1993, the family court entered final judgment in the underlying divorce case. In 2017, Anne filed a motion for post-judgment relief seeking an award of one-half interest in the marital portion of Steven's pension on the ground that Steven "concealed" the pension at the time of the divorce. The trial justice granted relief. The Supreme Court vacated the decision below, holding that the statute of limitations in R.I. Gen. Laws 9-1-17 barred Anne's belated request to reopen the final judgment. View "Capaldi v. Capaldi" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the family court determining and assigning marital property, sanctioning Defendant $50,000, and ordering a $16,000 credit to Plaintiff, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.In 2000, the parties in this case married, and in 2017, the parties initiated divorce proceedings based on irreconcilable difference. At issue before the Supreme Court was the trial court's determination and equitable distribution of marital assets. After an eight-day trial, the trial justice issued a bench decision. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice (1) did not err in the determination and assignment of marital assets; (2) did not err in the imposition of sanctions; and (3) did not abuse her discretion in ordering a $16,000 credit to Plaintiff. View "DiDonato v. DiDonato" on Justia Law