Matter of C.D.G.E.

C.D.G.E. was born in 2010. Since 2014, J.E. had primary residential responsibility of the child. A.P. was obligated to pay monthly child support payments. J.E. petitioned the district court to terminate A.P.'s parental rights. With his petition, he submitted an affidavit from A.P. in which she consented to terminating her parental rights. The petition referenced N.D.C.C. 14-15-19, which applied only "in connection with an adoption action," which was never contemplated here. All further proceedings, including J.E.'s proposed default order, J.E.'s argument at the hearing on the petition, and motion to reconsider, were considered by the parties and the district court under N.D.C.C. 27-20-45, which governed termination of parental rights where no adoption was pending. At the parental-termination hearing, J.E. argued that A.P. had both: (1) abandoned her child; and (2) consented to terminating her parental rights. The district court denied the petition without finding on the record whether A.P. had abandoned the child. In denying J.E.'s petition, the district court found that A.P. had not validly consented to terminating her parental rights. Ultimately, the district court denied the father's petition, concluding the child's welfare would not be served by terminating A.P.'s parental rights. J.E. appealed. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the petition where it was not established that denying the petition would seriously affect the child's welfare. View "Matter of C.D.G.E." on Justia Law