Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves an appeal against a county court's decision to appoint a permanent guardian for Patrick W., an individual deemed incapacitated due to a stroke. The appellant, Patrick W., argued that the court erred in admitting a neuropsychological report as evidence over his hearsay objection and that without this report, the evidence was insufficient to prove his incapacitation.Previously, Adult Protective Services (APS) had opened an investigation into Patrick's medical needs and financial management. Concerned about Patrick's vulnerability to financial exploitation, self-neglect, and undue influence, APS contacted an attorney to inquire about establishing a guardianship. Becky Stamp was identified as a potential guardian. The county court appointed Stamp as Patrick's temporary guardian, and later, Patrick's cousin, Terry Crandall, was substituted as the temporary guardian. The court also ordered Patrick to undergo a neuropsychological evaluation.At the guardianship hearing, the county court received several exhibits into evidence and heard testimony from six witnesses, including Patrick. The court found clear and convincing evidence that Patrick was incapacitated and appointed Crandall as his permanent guardian.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the county court's decision. It held that the neuropsychological report was admissible in evidence under Nebraska Revised Statute § 30-4204, as it was a medical report obtained by the guardian ad litem regarding the person for whom she was appointed. The court also found sufficient evidence to support the county court's finding that Patrick was incapacitated and that a full guardianship was the least restrictive alternative to provide for his continuing care. View "In re Guardianship of Patrick W." on Justia Law

The case involves a nonmarital child who was removed from the mother's custody due to neglect. The Department of Children and Families filed a care and protection petition in the Juvenile Court. The father, who had established paternity but had not sought custody prior to the filing of the petition, was granted temporary custody. The mother later waived her right to a hearing and stipulated that she was unfit, leading to the Juvenile Court judge awarding "permanent" custody to the father. However, the child filed a motion to dismiss the care and protection case, arguing that the Juvenile Court's custody order was sufficient to award permanent custody to the father.The Juvenile Court judge denied the child's motion, citing the statutory scheme which addresses the rights and responsibilities of the parents of nonmarital children. This scheme provides that the mother of a nonmarital child "shall" have custody "[i]n the absence of an order or judgment of a [P]robate and [F]amily [C]ourt [judge] relative to custody." The current practice in the Juvenile Court is to require the parent, who has been awarded permanent custody of the child in connection with a care and protection action, to seek an order of custody from the Probate and Family Court under the nonmarital child statutory scheme.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the Juvenile Court judge's order denying the child's motion to dismiss the care and protection case. The court agreed that the current practice best reflects the Legislature's intent and harmonizes the two statutory schemes. The court also concluded that the practice complies with due process. View "Care and Protection of Jaylen" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between a married couple, identified as Br. C. and Be. C., who have three-year-old twins. The dispute centers around a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) that Br. C. obtained against Be. C. The DVRO was granted after several incidents of verbal and physical abuse, including Be. C. yelling at Br. C., throwing objects, and using derogatory language. The court also admitted into evidence three audio recordings of Be. C.'s abusive behavior, which Br. C. had made prior to filing for the DVRO.The Superior Court of Placer County granted the DVRO, which protects Br. C., their two children, and their two dogs from Be. C. for a three-year period. Be. C. appealed the decision, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting the three recordings into evidence and that substantial evidence does not support the DVRO.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District reviewed the case. Be. C. challenged the admissibility of the three audio recordings, arguing that he did not know he was being recorded at the time. The court found that the recordings were admissible under section 633.6, subdivision (b) of the Penal Code, which allows a victim of domestic violence to record a confidential communication if they reasonably believe it may contain evidence relevant to a restraining order. The court also found that substantial evidence of domestic violence supported the trial court's ruling. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the Superior Court of Placer County, upholding the DVRO against Be. C. View "Br. C. v. Be. C." on Justia Law

The case involves S.Y.C., who appealed the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals dismissing her petition for writs of procedendo and mandamus against Judge Alison L. Floyd of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division. S.Y.C. sought to compel rulings on motions pending before Judge Floyd, who was overseeing the child-custody cases involving S.Y.C., her former partner, and their two children. The Eighth District dismissed S.Y.C.’s petition as moot, finding that Judge Floyd had disposed of the motions.The case originated in the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, and was transferred to Cuyahoga County in 2016. It involved multiple appeals, petitions for extraordinary writs, and affidavits of disqualification. S.Y.C. filed a petition for writs of procedendo and mandamus in the Eighth District, alleging that Judge Floyd had failed to rule on “at least seven” pending motions filed between April 2021 and August 2022. Judge Floyd filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that S.Y.C.’s petition was moot as the motions identified in S.Y.C.’s petition had been ruled on or withdrawn or were not a motion and therefore did not require a decision from the court.The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the Eighth District Court of Appeals’ judgment dismissing S.Y.C.’s petition for writs of procedendo and mandamus as moot. The court found that Judge Floyd had ruled on all the motions that were the subject of the petition, rendering moot S.Y.C.’s petition. The court also rejected S.Y.C.’s other arguments about Judge Floyd’s rulings, noting that S.Y.C. was essentially seeking an appellate review of Judge Floyd’s judgments, which is not the purpose of either procedendo or mandamus. View "State ex rel. S.Y.C. v. Floyd" on Justia Law

The case involves the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) in Rhode Island, which was held in contempt by the Family Court for failing to place a minor, N.B., in a specific facility, St. Mary’s Home for Children, as ordered by the court. N.B., who has behavioral issues and Type I juvenile diabetes, was initially placed in Hasbro Children’s Hospital after her mother refused to take her home due to safety concerns. The Family Court ordered DCYF to place N.B. at St. Mary’s, but the facility refused to admit her due to her medical needs and behavioral issues. Despite DCYF's efforts to secure a placement for N.B., including contacting multiple potential placements and attempting to hire nurses to monitor N.B.'s diabetic care needs, no suitable placement was available.The Family Court found DCYF in contempt for failing to place N.B. at St. Mary’s, rejecting DCYF's argument that it was impossible to comply with the placement order. The court ordered DCYF to pay a daily sanction until it complied with the order. DCYF appealed the contempt order, arguing that the Family Court abused its discretion by finding that DCYF had not exercised reasonable efforts to place N.B. and that it was impossible to comply with the placement order.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island vacated the Family Court’s contempt order. The Supreme Court found that DCYF had made substantial efforts to place N.B. at St. Mary’s and other appropriate facilities, but compliance with the placement order was outside the department’s control due to circumstances such as the refusal of facilities to accept N.B. and ongoing nursing shortages related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Supreme Court concluded that the Family Court had abused its discretion in finding that DCYF had not used reasonable efforts to place N.B. and in holding DCYF in contempt. View "In re N.B." on Justia Law

The case involves the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) in Rhode Island, which was held in contempt by the Family Court for failing to place a minor, N.D., in a residential facility appropriate for her level of need. N.D., a teenager with severe mental health issues, was under the temporary custody of DCYF. Despite the court's order, DCYF was unable to find an appropriate in-state or out-of-state placement for N.D. due to her high level of need and the lack of available facilities. The Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) filed a motion to adjudge DCYF in contempt for this failure.The Family Court found DCYF in contempt, rejecting DCYF's defense that it was unable to comply with the court's order. The court imposed a contempt sanction of $1,000 per day until N.D. was placed in an appropriate facility, with the sanction to be placed in a trust for N.D.'s benefit. DCYF appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island vacated the order of the Family Court. The Supreme Court found that while DCYF was in technical violation of the Family Court's order, it had demonstrated that it was literally unable to comply because an appropriate placement for N.D. was not presently within its power. The court noted the lack of appropriate facilities for girls with N.D.'s level of need in Rhode Island, staffing issues, and an increase in mental health problems among adolescents. The case was remanded to the Family Court for further proceedings. View "In re N.D." on Justia Law

Brennan Grubb was convicted of sexually abusing a minor, which resulted in severe emotional trauma for the young boy. The boy's mother, a teacher, resigned from her job to care for her son. Grubb pleaded guilty to the charges and was ordered by the superior court to pay restitution, including compensation for the mother's future lost wages and benefits. Grubb appealed the restitution order, arguing that his criminal conduct was not the proximate cause of the mother's future lost wages and benefits. The court of appeals agreed with Grubb and vacated the restitution order.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reversed the decision of the court of appeals. The court held that the mother's resignation from her teaching position was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of Grubb's criminal conduct. The court remanded the case to the court of appeals for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court emphasized that the legislature has steadily expanded the rights of crime victims to obtain restitution and that the statutory right to restitution must factor into the proximate cause analysis. The court also noted that the statutory definition of "victim" necessarily affects the proximate cause analysis. The court concluded that it was error to hold as a matter of law that Grubb's conduct could not be the proximate cause of the mother's future lost wages and benefits. View "State v. Grubb" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Sabrina Dunn, who was charged with murder after shooting her ex-husband, Bill Dunn, in her home. The couple had a history of domestic disputes, with Bill exhibiting erratic and abusive behavior, leading Sabrina to obtain multiple protective orders against him. Despite these orders, Bill continued to harass Sabrina, often breaking into her home. On the day of the incident, Bill entered Sabrina's home uninvited, carrying knives. Fearing for her life, Sabrina shot and killed him.The trial court instructed the jury that the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Sabrina did not act in self-defense “and/or” in defense of her dwelling. Sabrina was found guilty of murder and sentenced to a maximum term of sixty-five years. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction but revised the sentence to fifty-five years with five years suspended.The Indiana Supreme Court, however, found that the use of “and/or” in the jury instructions was ambiguous and potentially misleading. The court noted that the jury needed to understand that the State had to prove that Sabrina did not act in either self-defense or in defense of her dwelling. The ambiguous instructions, the court concluded, could have led the jury to believe that the State only needed to disprove one of these defenses, not both. Given the strength of Sabrina's defense-of-dwelling claim, the court found a serious risk that she was wrongly convicted. As a result, the court vacated Sabrina's murder conviction and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Dunn v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves a divorce proceeding initiated by Jolene K. Makuch against John Makuch III in the Geauga County Common Pleas Court. Jolene represented herself, stating she could not afford representation. After the trial, the magistrate noted that Jolene had failed to provide evidence regarding the division of marital property, spousal or child support, or attorney fees. The magistrate ordered a hearing for the parties to present additional evidence on these matters. John objected to the magistrate's decision, challenging the order for a hearing to present additional evidence.The Common Pleas Court, presided over by Judge Carolyn J. Paschke, overruled John's objections and adopted the magistrate's decision. The court noted that the parties had failed to present sufficient evidence at trial regarding the nature, extent, and value of the marital property, their income, and debts. The court set a future hearing date for the parties to present complete evidence on these matters. John appealed this decision to the Eleventh District Court of Appeals.The Court of Appeals dismissed John's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, determining that Judge Paschke's entry was not a final order under R.C. 2505.02(B). The court explained that in a divorce action, no final appealable order exists until all issues relating to property division, support, and parental rights and responsibilities have been addressed. John then appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio.The Supreme Court of Ohio declined to accept jurisdiction in this discretionary appeal filed on behalf of John. The court found the appeal to be frivolous, as it was neither warranted by existing law nor supported by a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. The court denied John's motions for clarification and for leave to file a supplemental brief. The court also declined to impose sanctions on John's counsel, who had previously been declared to be vexatious litigators. View "Makuch v. Makuch" on Justia Law

The case involves T.S. (Mother) and A.A. (Father) who appealed the termination of their parental rights to their minor children (D.A., L.A., and F.A.) by the Montana Second Judicial District Court. The Child and Family Services Division of the Montana Department of Health and Human Services (Department) became involved with the family in August 2019 when two of the children were found wandering the streets unsupervised. The Department had previously been involved with the family due to allegations of child abuse or neglect. In August 2019, the Department removed the children from the parents' care and placed them in a protective kinship placement. The parents were given treatment plans to follow for potential reunification with their children.Despite multiple extensions to complete their treatment plans, neither parent had successfully completed all requirements by January 2022. As a result, the Department transitioned to court-ordered guardianships as the new permanency plan for the children. In March 2022, the Department petitioned for termination of parental rights due to the parents' failure to complete their treatment plans and their inability to provide adequate parental care. The District Court issued judgments terminating the parents' respective parental rights.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the District Court's findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence and that the parents had failed to demonstrate that any material District Court finding of fact was clearly erroneous. The court also held that the District Court did not terminate the parents' respective parental rights without clear and convincing evidence that the Department made reasonable family preservation and reunification efforts. The court concluded that the District Court correctly terminated the parents' respective parental rights under § 41-3-609(1)(f), MCA. View "In re F.A." on Justia Law